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As immigration reform initiatives driven by established advocacy organizations in 
Washington, D.C. were successively defeated in the mid-to-late 2000s, movement-
centered organizations and newly created formations of undocumented youth mobilized 
against the federal-local immigration enforcement regime of the Bush and Obama 
administrations.  This mobilization included a mix of community organizing, litigation, 
policy and media advocacy, and direct action tactics.  Lawyers supported movement-
centered social change campaigns as counsel to existing organizations and to the 
undocumented youth groups that grew, evolved, and multiplied during this period. 
Drawing on media, scholarly, and first person accounts, this Article describes the 
campaigns that constituted the anti-enforcement mobilization between 2009 and 2012, 
with particular focus on the range of roles played by lawyers and the implications of that 
repertoire in theorizing about resistance to legality and the place of law and lawyering in 
social movement activism.
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In the last decade, social movement organizations and newly created for-
mations of undocumented youth mobilized against the immigration enforcement 
regimes of the Bush and Obama administrations.  This mobilization included a 
mix of community organizing, litigation, policy and media advocacy, and direct 
action tactics.  Lawyers supported movement-centered social change campaigns 
as counsel to existing organizations and to the undocumented youth groups that 
grew, evolved, and multiplied during this period.1 
The first phase—between 2009 and 2012—is the subject of this Article.2  
As immigrant activism was ascendant due to the political maturation and 
engagement of a generation of mostly undocumented youth, lawyers worked 
with social movement organizations and newly created activist groups to advance 
a series of organizing initiatives against the detention and deportation regime.  
They confronted entrenched white supremacist forces in Arizona terrorizing 
immigrant communities through racial profiling and criminalization.3  They 
simultaneously faced incumbent policy advocates in Washington, D.C. waiting 
for a grand deal that would both expand immigration enforcement and offer an 
extended and highly contingent route to citizenship for undocumented resi-
dents.4  In this environment of instability and inefficacy, movement actors and 
lawyers waged surprisingly successful campaigns to discourage local authorities 
from enforcing federal immigration law and to defend immigrants from interior 
enforcement through categorical grants of relief from deportation.  This Article 
looks closely at how those campaigns unfolded, with particular focus on the role 
of lawyers engaged in collaborations with movement leaders, activists, and con-
stituents. 
This work extends and complicates at least two sets of legal academic litera-
tures.  First, within socio-legal studies, a group of scholars—most prominently, 
  
1. This Article refers to movement formations as composed of undocumented activists, though 
individuals with a variety of legal statuses were core members. 
2. The latter two phases extend from 2012 to 2014 when newly emboldened immigrant activists 
engaged in extra-legal activities, including civil disobedience, that illuminated foundational 
alterations in immigrant defense lawyering and governing ethical frameworks.  Between 2014 and 
2016, the immigrant rights movement confronted a nation-wide federal court injunction.  I will 
discuss these latter phases in subsequent work.  Another delineation: this Article focuses largely on 
the Southern California node of a nation-wide, complex, and multi-polar social movement of 
immigrant activists.  It is not intended to be a complete history of all of the social movement 
organizations active in the field in this period. 
3. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
4. See discussion infra Sections I.A, I.B. 
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Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey5 and Austin Sarat6—have engaged in qualitative 
research on how individuals resist legal regimes in everyday life.  Their findings 
expand how we conceive of law and legality: as formal and informal, constraining 
and liberating, immersive and iterative.  However, as it redefines law and resistance, 
this literature pays less attention to the roles of lawyers, perhaps due to the 
overarching effort to expand the field of study beyond courtrooms and legislative 
chambers where lawyers predominate.  The narrative of social movement mobili-
zation documented in this Article portrays resistance activities largely outside of 
those formal venues of law.  However, lawyers remain a part of the story, as facili-
tators, enablers, and defenders, especially as governing regimes adapt and deploy 
legality to abate burgeoning resistance.  If we work to uncover a process of 
resistance rather than individual acts in isolation, we can begin to disaggregate 
the essential roles of participants in that process.  This Article describes a process 
of resistance in the context of immigrant rights advocacy and discerns a distinc-
tive role for lawyers, particularly in efforts led by laypeople to reconstruct legality. 
Second, this Article extends and renews the critical legal academic literature 
on public interest lawyering, exemplified by the work of Gerald López,7 Lucie 
White,8 Tony Alfieri,9 and others.  Following a wave of critical studies within the 
legal academy, these authors captured disillusion with public interest law in the 
aftermath of the civil rights era and in the midst of Reagan-era assaults on poor 
people and the social safety net.  They looked to the bottom within the United 
States or to the Global South to unearth stories of collaborations between 
lawyers and clients.  Consistent with the client-centered advocacy ideology 
being advanced in clinical legal education at the time,10 these scholars were par-
ticularly attentive to the problem of lawyer domination in relationships with poor 
clients.  The result was a body of work that charged generations of law graduates 
with the responsibility to respect and defer to laypeople, to advance the agency of 
  
5. See generally Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account 
of Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992) [hereinafter Ewick & Silbey, 
Conformity]; Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal 
Authority, 108 AM. J. SOC. 1328 (2003) [hereinafter Ewick & Silbey, Narrating]. 
6. See generally Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of 
the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990). 
7. See, e.g., Gerald LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). 
8. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the 
Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF L. REV. 1 (1990). 
9. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 
16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987–88) [hereinafter Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty]; 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993). 
10. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A 
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079764
1468 64 UCLA L. REV. 1464 (2017) 
 
clients, and to put aside the grander visions of lawyer-centered social change 
harbored by preceding generations.  Like the recent historical work on the long 
civil rights movement,11 this Article brings to the surface recessive threads of am-
bitious public interest lawyers and activated collectives dynamically collaborating 
with a higher level of engagement, solidarity, and efficacy than contemplated in 
earlier scholarly work. 
This Article also contributes to a much-needed collection of works focused on 
contemporaneous movement lawyering, including focus on the roles of lawyers 
supporting Black Lives Matter-affiliated groups around the country, as well as 
environmental justice, Indigenous Peoples’, Title IX, and transgender activism.  
In this particular moment in American political culture, the propagation of 
accounts of activists and lawyers engaged in creative social justice campaigns is a 
worthy end in and of itself. 
Part I of this Article sets out the mobilization narrative of immigrant rights 
activists fighting for movement control, who were supported by lawyers located 
outside of the most prominent public interest litigation shops in the field.  The 
arc of the story moves from renewed hope for a path to citizenship at the dawn of 
the Obama era to disappointment, recalibration, and renewal.  Part II situates the 
mobilization narrative within socio-legal studies on resistance to legality and sets 
forth a process of resistance with an essential role for allied lawyers.  As described 
below, movement actors resist legality and attempt to reconstruct it, particularly 
when their very existence as participants in the polity is at stake.  Lawyers support 
that existential turn to reconstruction.  Part III sets out the core features of 
movement lawyering as documented in this immigrant rights narrative, including 
the development of critical movement infrastructure—both ideational and or-
ganizational, co-generation of resources for organizing, and accompaniment and 
openness to transformation.  This Article concludes with a brief reflection on the 
meaning of this mobilization narrative in the Trump era. 
I. MOBILIZATION 
The campaigns waged by immigrant advocates between 2009 and 2012 
culminated in the announcement by President Obama of relief from deportation 
  
11. See, e.g., TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011); SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING THE 
STRUGGLE: NATIONAL RACIAL JUSTICE ORGANIZING, 1880–1915 (2013); KENNETH W. 
MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012). 
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for undocumented youth with strong ties to the United States.12  The Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) was a significant and surprising 
victory for a determined network of undocumented youth activists and their 
allies.  This Part discusses the mobilization that led to this victory in four stages: 
first, the initial hope for comprehensive immigration reform (CIR)13 offered by 
the election of President Obama and Democratic majorities in both houses of 
Congress; second, the failure of legislative reform and the rise of an advocacy 
network opposed to some of the tactics and goals of the incumbent political actors; 
third, the continued expansion of immigration enforcement in the interior of the 
United States and the need for creative advocacy responses; and fourth, the policy 
struggle that led to the establishment of DACA. 
A. Legislative Opportunity 
Immigration advocacy organizations agitated to create a path to naturaliza-
tion for the undocumented in the 2000s against a backdrop of policy and cultural 
shifts precipitated by 9/11.  Immigration enforcement—first at the Department 
of Justice and later at the Department of Homeland Security—became a central 
site within the federal government for the Bush Administration’s “war on terror.”14  
Government actors deployed their enhanced enforcement capacity against Latinx 
communities,15 while immigration restrictionists outside of government crafted 
“a powerful apocalyptic narrative, relying on emotionally evocative metaphors 
  
12. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Remarks by the President on 
Immigration (June 15, 2012, 2:59 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/ 
06/15/remarks-president-immigration [https://perma.cc/Y9AU-GJEN]. 
13. Comprehensive immigration reform proposals have varied in content but have generally included 
increased border security, immigration verification requirements for employers, and a pathway 
to citizenship or conditional immigration relief for undocumented immigrants already living in the 
United States.  A recent example is S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013). 
14. David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of 
Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 5, 17–19 (2006) (outlining the advantages 
offered by immigration law in enforcement efforts against individuals alleged to be involved in 
terrorist activity). 
15. See Nicholas De Genova, The Production of Culprits: From Deportability to Detainability in the 
Aftermath of “Homeland Security”, 11 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 421, 427–28 (2007).  I refer to members 
of immigrant communities with origins in Mexico, Central and South America, and parts of the 
Caribbean basin as “Latinx” in this Article.  See Raquel Reichard, Why We Say Latinx: Trans & 
Gender Non-Conforming People Explain, LATINA (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.latina.com/lifestyle 
/our-issues/why-we-say-latinx-trans-gender-non-conforming-people-explain [https://perma.cc/ 
P8A9-AKNP]. 
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and synecdoches to shift the debate in an anti-immigrant direction by making 
immigrants synonymous with criminals, and then terrorists.”16 
Between 2001 and 2008, established advocacy organizations worked to 
construct the counter-narrative of the “DREAMers,” talented young undocu-
mented students deprived of equal opportunity due to their lack of legal status.17  
Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Luis Gutierrez had introduced the first 
iteration of the DREAM (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors) 
Act just before 9/11 on August 1, 2001.18  The legislation would have allowed 
those undocumented residents of “good moral character” who had come to the 
United States at a young age and had since completed high school to adjust their 
status and avoid deportation.19  Later versions of the bill also promised a path to 
naturalization to U.S. military enlistees.20  According to sociologist Walter 
Nicholls, established advocacy organizations devised the DREAMer campaign 
in Congress and controlled its messaging in the public sphere.21  Nicholls goes on 
to describe the strict framing imposed on participants in the political organizing: 
[T]he leadership centralized message production, structured messages 
through the use of talking points, and silenced utterances and symbols 
that detracted from the core argument.  Just as important, they disci-
  
16. Julie Stewart, Fiction Over Facts: How Competing Narrative Forms Explain Policy in a New 
Immigration Destination, 27 SOC. F. 591, 609 (2012); see, e.g., Mark Krikorian, Keeping Terror Out, 
NAT’L INT., Spring 2004, at 77, 78.  “Restrictionists” seek to limit immigration, while 
“restrictionism” refers to a policy or philosophy favoring the restriction of immigration.  See Daniel 
Kanstroom, Crying Wolf or a Dying Canary?, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 435, 455–56 
(1999) (book review) (discussing definitions of restrictionism). 
17. WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE DREAMERS: HOW THE UNDOCUMENTED YOUTH 
MOVEMENT TRANSFORMED THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEBATE 13–14 (2013).  The 
National Immigration Law Center (NILC) and the Center for Community Change were the 
primary drafters of the DREAM Act and advocated for it in Congress.  Id. at 31.  NILC later 
helped found United We Dream, “a site where national rights associations worked with youths to 
produce the core messages of the campaign.”  Walter J. Nicholls & Tara Fiorito, Dreamers 
Unbound: Immigrant Youth Mobilizing, NEW LAB. F. (Jan. 19 2015), http://newlabor 
forum.cuny.edu/2015/01/19/dreamers-unbound-immigrant-youth-mobilizing/ [https://perma.cc 
/W4VX-5FVF].  Nicholls characterizes these organizations, and a few others noted below, infra 
note 41, as “well-established advocacy organizations” in possession of cultural and symbolic capital 
that they shared with immigrant youth activists.  NICHOLLS, supra, at 13.  I refer to these 
organizations collectively as the “established advocacy organizations” throughout this Article. 
18. S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001). 
19. Id. § 3(a)(1)(e).  But see Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform 
and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 141–54 (2013) (criticizing the DREAM Act framework for 
determining worthiness); Fanny Lauby, Leaving the ‘Perfect DREAMer’ Behind? Narratives and 
Mobilization in Immigration Reform, 15 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 374, 380–82 (2016) (noting 
that the DREAMer narrative focused on the relative deservingness of a subset of the 
undocumented population). 
20. See S. 1545, 18th Cong. § 5(d)(2003). 
21. NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 13–14. 
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plined undocumented youth activists who were responsible for carrying 
the message into the public sphere. . . . Training sessions helped 
socialize youth activists into the DREAMer discourse, shaped their 
views of their place and rights in the country, and contributed to forming 
individual undocumented youths into a common political subject with 
common worldviews, aspirations, and emotional dispositions.22 
The established advocacy organizations worked closely with allies in Congress 
to create a class of “good” undocumented immigrants especially deserving of a 
path to naturalization. 
Introduction in 2005 of an “enforcement-first” bill by Representative Jim 
Sensenbrenner telegraphed that many in power believed there are no “good” 
immigrants among those who have entered the country illegally.  The Border 
Protection, Anti-Terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act (the 
Sensenbrenner Bill) emphasized the perceived need to crack down on the undoc-
umented population in the United States.23  The bill would have changed an initial 
illegal entry from a misdemeanor24 to a felony and increased criminal liability for 
anyone who assists an undocumented person in remaining in the United States, 
among other punitive enforcement measures.25  The bill passed in the U.S. 
House of Representatives at the end of 200526 but failed to progress in the Sen-
ate.27  Established advocacy organizations and new institutional players, 
such as state federations of hometown associations, services unions, ethnic 
radio, and religious organizations without prior involvement in advocacy, used 
the Sensenbrenner Bill to mobilize Latinx and immigrant communities.28  In 
March 2006, one hundred thousand people marched in Chicago against the bill 
and in favor of CIR.29  One month later, there were similar marches in 140 cities 
across the country; a second march in Chicago and in Dallas numbered in the 
hundreds of thousands.30  The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, 
  
22. Id. at 14. 
23. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). 
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 275(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). 
25. Id. § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324. 
26. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H12014 (2005). 
27. S. 2454, 109th Cong., 152 CONG. REC. S3358 (2006). 
28. See Louis DeSipio, Drawing New Lines in the Sand: Evaluating the Failure of Immigration Reforms 
from 2006 to the Beginning of the Obama Administration, in RALLYING FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: 
THE FIGHT FOR INCLUSION IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA 215, 216–18 (Kim Voss & Irene 
Bloemraad eds., 2011). 
29. See Oscar Avila & Antonio Olivo, A Show of Strength; Thousands March to Loop for Immigrants’ 
Rights, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2006, at A1. 
30. See Laura Griffin, Huge Rally in Dallas in Support of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/us/09cnd-protest.html; Rallies Across U.S. Call for Illegal 
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supported by the Bush Administration,31 passed the Senate in May 200632 but was 
not taken up by the House. 
The Bush Administration was unable to overcome the objections to CIR of 
Republican restrictionists, even as it moved aggressively to enforce immigration 
law in the field.  On May 12, 2008, the Administration mounted the largest 
immigration raid in U.S. history at a meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa, in 
which undocumented workers were rounded up, threatened with criminal prose-
cution, and subjected to summary immigration proceedings in makeshift 
courtrooms created specifically to process captives from the raid.33  That same 
year, the Bush Administration initiated “Secure Communities: A Comprehensive 
Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens” (S-Comm), which expanded 
federal-local immigration enforcement coordination by automating information 
sharing and imposing mandated detention policies for immigrants caught up in 
local law enforcement.34  Under S-Comm, a participating local law enforcement 
agency would run an individual’s biometric information through multiple 
databases, including one for civil immigration violations.35  This would occur 
subsequent to any kind of arrest, even on minor charges or on charges later 
dropped.36  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement would then ask the 
local agency to hold an individual with a civil immigration violation on record for 
later transfer to federal authorities.37  In September 2008, Congress appropriated 
funds to support the program.38 
Candidate Obama campaigned on fixing the immigration system and so 
raised the hopes of reformers.39  However, the rollout of S-Comm continued 
  
Immigrant Rights, CNN (Apr. 10, 2006, 10:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/ 
04/10/immigration/index.html?section=cnn_us [https://perma.cc/CJ7N-6W86]. 
31. S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006). 
32. Id. 
33. See Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting After the Largest ICE Raid in US History: A Personal Account, 
7 LATINO STUD. 123 (2009). 
34. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 
TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 1 (2009) [hereinafter SECURE COMMUNITIES 
PLAN], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan 
09.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EYS-C7PD]; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM PRESENTATIONS (2009–10) [hereinafter SECURE 
COMMUNITIES PRESENTATIONS], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/secure 
communitiespresentations.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7AT-PZ7D]. 
35. SECURE COMMUNITIES PLAN, supra note 34, at 2. 
36. Id. 
37. See id. 
38. See SECURE COMMUNITIES PRESENTATIONS, supra note 34, at 4. 
39. See Molly Ball, Obama’s Long Immigration Betrayal, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2014) http://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/obamas-long-immigration-betrayal/379839 [https:// 
perma.cc/M4VB-C4EJ]. 
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unabated in his administration.  For example, in January 2009, an ICE official 
initiated the program’s implementation in California in a letter to the state 
Department of Justice requesting the execution of a memorandum of agreement.40  
Nevertheless, advocates were hopeful that they might see legislative progress on 
immigration reform under the new administration.  In Washington, D.C. (and 
at more than forty events in thirty-five states), a broad coalition of labor, business, 
civil rights, religious, and community organizations joined together in June 2009 
to announce the formation of Reform Immigration FOR America (RIFA).41  
The coalition advocated a path to citizenship for the undocumented with an em-
phasis on preserving family unity, strengthening labor standards, and enforcing 
the border.42  RIFA deployed a “national text messaging system and various on-line 
organizing strategies” to begin mobilizing for the expected legislative push for 
comprehensive immigration reform.43 
B. Dissident Organizing 
That push never came.  The poor economy and high unemployment rate, 
the oppositional tack of the Republican minorities in both houses, and the focus 
of the Obama Administration and congressional leadership on the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the Affordable Care Act put immigration 
reform in suspension.44  RIFA turned out 250,000 people for a demonstration in 
Washington, D.C. in March 2010 that did not move the needle in Congress.45  
  
40. Letter from David J. Venturella, Exec. Dir., Secure Comtys., to Linda Denly, Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 
23, 2009), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/z_Personal/AJohnson/ 
Venturella_Letter_090410.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W82-VBPE]. 
41. Press Release, Mark McCullough, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Reform Immigration FOR America 
Campaign Launched to Spearhead National Immigration Reform Effort (June 3, 2009), 
http://old.seiu.org/2009/06/reform-immigration-for-america-campaign-launched-to-spearhead-
national-immigration-reform-effort.php [https://perma.cc/EGQ5-YNQ6].  Reform Immigration 
for America (RIFA) was funded by major foundations such as Atlantic Philanthropies and 
principal members included Center for Community Change, National Council of La Raza, and 
the National Immigration Forum.  NICHOLLS, supra 17, at 43.  NILC, Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), National Day Laborer Organizing Network 
(NDLON) were members of the coalition but had less central roles.  Id. at 44.  Los Angeles’s 
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) brought youth chapters from across 
California into the coalition and in its advocacy for comprehensive immigration reform.  Id. 
42. Our Principles, REFORM IMMIGRATION AM., https://reformimmigrationforamerica.org/our-
principles [https://perma.cc/VA9W-9CTJ]. 
43. Press Release, Mark McCullough, supra note 41. 
44. See Josh Hicks, Obama’s Failed Promise of a First-Year Immigration Overhaul, WASH. POST (Sept. 
25, 2012), http://wpo.st/5XJQ2 [https://perma.cc/FRQ8-8QVY]. 
45. See N.C. Aizenman, Broad Coalition Packs Mall to Urge Overhaul of Immigration Laws, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/ 
21/AR2010032100956.html. 
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The legislative stasis, as well as the continued expansion of S-Comm by the 
Administration, strained relationships and alliances within RIFA.  Immigrant 
youth leaders that were mobilized—and in some cases trained—by RIFA were 
less patient with the politicians than established advocacy organizations with 
close ties to the Administration and Congress.  They began to agitate for the use 
of more aggressive tactics and different strategic goals. 
Four undocumented students—Felipe Matos, Gaby Pacheco, Carlos Roa, 
and Juan Rodriguez—set out on foot on what they called the “Trail of 
DREAMS” on January 1, 2010, from Miami to Washington, D.C.46  Five 
others—Marisol Ramos, Martin Lopez, Daniela Hidalgo, Jose Luis Zacatelco, 
and Gabriel Martinez—left from New York for D.C. on April 10.47  The stu-
dents were supported by state-based immigrant advocacy organizations in Florida 
and New York, as well as the National Day Laborer Organizing Network 
(NDLON) and Puente Arizona.48  Juan Rodriguez recalled the moment in late 
2009 that he was spurred to begin the campaign: 
I’m leaving. . . . I can’t keep waiting for them to give me an answer, 
hoping that maybe SOMEDAY, someone will actually listen to my 
question.  I can’t just stay here in my daily cycles acting like this way of 
life is manageable or bearable.  It isn’t.  It can NEVER be bearable to 
lose the people that we love.  It can NEVER be bearable to wake up 
each morning and know that people in our communities have 
disappeared—taken in the darkness of the night by those that claim 
to be keeping our communities “secure.”49 
The Trail of DREAMS was motivated by a strong sense of frustration with 
the wait for progress in D.C., as well as the ongoing deportations and an expanding 
S-Comm program.  On April 23, 2010, while the students were walking, Arizona 
Governor Jan Brewer signed SB 1070—the Support Our Law Enforcement and 
Safe Neighborhoods Act50—into law.51  The legislation, drafted by then-law pro-
fessor and “issue entrepreneur” Kris Kobach, carried forward the enforcement-only 
approach that animated the 2006 Sensenbrenner Bill and empowered local crim-
  
46. David Montgomery, Trail of Dream Students Walk 1,500 Miles to Bring Immigration Message to 
Washington, WASH. POST (May 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001384.html [https://perma.cc/B7LR-2FGG]. 
47. About, TRAIL DREAMS, http://trail2010.org/about/#NYC [https://perma.cc/LC8E-MR3X]. 
48. Id. 
49. Juan Rodriguez, New Year’s Day 2010, TRAIL DREAMS (Jan. 1, 2010), http://trail2010.org/ 
blog/2010/jan/1/new-years-day-2010 [https://perma.cc/3ZVF-LHQM]. 
50  Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 2010) (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. titles 11, 13, 23, 28, 41). 
51. Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html [https://perma.cc/KJ2Z-QN76]. 
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inal justice actors in Arizona to stop, arrest, and convict those suspected of being 
undocumented.52  After this development, the student walk to Washington, D.C. 
culminated in meetings with Administration officials and a protest on May 1, 
2010, timed to coincide with nationwide demonstrations against the new Arizo-
na law.53  Thirty-five people, including Illinois Representative Luis Gutierrez, were 
arrested in front of the White House.54  Nicholls noted that “dissident 
DREAMers in Los Angeles, Chicago, Michigan, and New York felt the time 
was right to escalate the struggle.”55  They agitated against the new Arizona law 
and, at the federal level, came to embrace a standalone bill focused on DREAMers 
and the AgJOBS bill (which would have provided immigration status to a class of 
farmworkers)56 rather than continuing to wait for movement on CIR.57 
The expanding network of student leaders and their quest for a standalone 
DREAM Act had the support of NDLON and lawyers from the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), as well as the 
UCLA Labor Center, a key bridge-building institution in Southern California.58  
NDLON maintained a small legal department and collaborated extensively 
with MALDEF in its earlier campaigns in defense of day laborers in various 
  
52. See S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in 
Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 1445 (2012) (“Our framework highlights the 
influence of these issue entrepreneurs in creating optimal conditions for subnational immigration 
regulation, framing the narrative necessary for judicial and political acceptance of restrictionist 
legislation, and targeting specific jurisdictions with partisan conditions that are ripe for enacting 
such regulation, with an eye to more widespread adoption.”); Alia Beard Rau, Arizona Immigration 
Law Was Crafted by Rising Star Activist, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (May 31, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/05/31/20100531arizona-immigration-law-kris-
kobach.html [https://perma.cc/Q4VW-P5XK]. 
53. Julia Preston, Immigration Advocates Rally for Change, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/us/02immig.html [https://perma.cc/H6YZ-YWA8]. 
54. Immigration Law “Awakened a Sleeping Giant”, CBS NEWS (May 1, 2010, 10:07 PM), http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/immigration-law-awakened-a-sleeping-giant [https://perma.cc/JL4A-
URL7]. 
55. NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 80. 
56  See H.R. 2414, 111th Cong. (2009) 
57 See Alexander Bolton, Durbin’s Dream Act Could Run Afoul of Schumer’s Bill, HILL (May 24, 2010, 
11:44 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/99629-durbins-dream-act-could-run-afoul-of-
schumers-bill [https://perma.cc/9EKK-RCER] (describing the competition between standalone 
and comprehensive immigration reform bills within Congress). 
58. Nicholls & Fiorito, supra note 17, at 90.  MALDEF President and General Counsel Thomas 
Saenz made comments as early as 2009 indicating an acceptance of piecemeal reform.  Suzanne 
Gamboa, Leader Has Back-up Immigration Plan, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 25, 2009, 2:03 
PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-us-immigration-ap-interview-092509-2009 
sep25-story.html [https://perma.cc/XB46-HN5J].  He maintained strong ties to NDLON on its 
anti-enforcement work and to student leaders who were rapidly finding their voice and asserting 
independent views.  Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, Legal Dir., Nat’l Day Labor Org. 
Network (June 29, 2016). 
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jurisdictions in Southern California.59  According to Nicholls, NDLON saw 
strategic advantage in allying its day laborer constituents with the dissident 
organizers and provided key legal, organizing, and logistical support to the nascent 
movement among undocumented youth.60  NDLON Legal Director Chris 
Newman remembers the alliance as being constructed less strategically and more 
as a reaction to ineffective theories of social change inherent in the approach of 
the other established immigrant rights organizations: 
This more radical group came to us to ask for their support as they 
were breaking off from the rest.  This became the most potent and dy-
namic element of the movement. . . . We wanted to support them 
without contributing to more conflicts in the movement.  We quietly 
made the infrastructure of NDLON available to the youths.  We said, 
“If you need office space, we have an office in Washington, DC, here 
it is.  If you need a place to stay around the country, here is a list of our 
organizing staff, you can stay in their houses.”  We have made 
everything we have available to them: here are our lawyers, here are 
our contacts, use them.  And, they did.61 
While RIFA remained closely aligned with the Administration’s enforcement-
first approach to comprehensive reform, the large and influential immigrant 
rights legal organizations that came to Arizona to fight SB 1070—including the 
ACLU Immigrant Rights Project (ACLU-IRP) and the National Immigration 
Law Center (NILC)—pursued an impact litigation strategy that relied on federal 
courts to reinforce a less racist and more nuanced federal approach to immigration 
enforcement.62  Ultimately, in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, applying preemp-
tion doctrine,63 struck down provisions of SB 1070 that enabled the state crimi-
nalization of immigration status, but upheld what became known as the “show 
your papers” provisions allowing state law enforcement officials to deter-
mine the immigration status of anyone they stop or arrest based on reasonable 
  
59. See Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1617, 1641–63, 1672–74 (2011) (describing the NDLON-MALDEF alliance in successive day 
labor ordinance battles in the region). 
60. NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 82. 
61. Id. at 83 (quoting Chris Newman). 
62. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58. 
63. Preemption is a doctrine of American constitutional law which stems from notions of federalism 
and the Supremacy Clause.  Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law.  See 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).  Generally, there are three ways 
a state or local law may be preempted; through a federal statute containing an express preemption 
provision; in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated through its exclusive 
governance; and when state laws conflict with federal law.  See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 
387, 398–400 (2012). 
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suspicion.64  However, the established advocacy organizations and some of the 
lawyers litigating in Arizona had “an allergy [to] justice-based arguments” and did 
not invoke white supremacy as a core motivation for the Arizona legislative en-
actments.65  Lawyers on the ground—most prominently at the ACLU of Arizo-
na—had strong ties with community organizations and consistently worked to 
integrate their narratives, particularly around race, into the SB 1070 litigation.66  
The litigation team was large; no one doubted the racial animus embedded in the 
Arizona enactments, but lawyers had differing levels of commitment to ad-
vancing movement narratives in litigation.  The emphasis of some of the public 
interest litigators and the federal government was on constructing effective legal ar-
guments and not necessarily on building political power on the ground.67 
  
64. Arizona, 567 U.S. 387, 411–15. 
65. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58. 
66. E-mail from Annie Lai, former Staff Atty., ACLU of Ariz., to author (Aug. 29, 2017, 07:37 PST) 
(on file with author); see, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 47–51, 56, 60, 
Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CV 10-1061), 2010 WL 
11417816 (including race-based allegations and Equal Protection and Section 1981 claims).  
Friendly House was a parallel case to the one ultimately heard by the U.S. Supreme Court and 
brought by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  See Arizona, 567 U.S. 387.  Local and 
movement-centered lawyers had significantly less influence in the conduct of the DOJ litigation. 
67. E-mail from Annie Lai, supra note 66.  The open question is whether the content of arguments in 
complaints and briefs irretrievably shape or limit the scope of narratives that can be used outside of 
court to undertake political mobilizations.  Former MALDEF litigator Kristina M. Campbell 
thinks that legal argument matters in her analysis of the use of the First Amendment in the defense 
of day laborers.  See generally Kristen M. Campbell, The High Cost of Free Speech: Anti-Solicitation 
Ordinances, Day Laborers, and the Impact of “Backdoor” Local Immigration Regulations, 25 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 27–32 (2010).  Campbell posits that the litigation strategy trades away a necessary 
focus on racism in law enforcement—which would support an equal protection argument—for 
short-term success in the courts.  Id.  Hiroshi Motomura challenges the alleged mutual exclusivity 
of litigation strategy, instead arguing that preemption doctrine may serve as a container for equal 
protection concerns in litigation.  Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and 
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1731–46. 
[P]reemption and equal protection can function roughly as alternative vehicles for 
expressing concern about racial and ethnic discrimination.  Plaintiffs will likely lose 
an equal protection argument because of the law’s requirement of discriminatory intent 
and its presumption against finding it.  A preemption argument can manage doubt 
differently by shifting the risk of uncertain knowledge from the plaintiff to state and 
local governments.  Courts may sustain preemption challenges out of concern that 
state and local laws addressing unauthorized migration give state and local actors a 
zone of discretion that is too broad because it enables improper reliance on race and 
ethnicity. 
 Id. at 1744.  But see David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
983, 1006–12 (2016) (book review) (characterizing as unlikely the wide use by courts of 
preemption doctrine as a proxy for equal protection); see also Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to 
Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 768–72 (1995) (arguing for 
expanding the scope of factual matter included in civil rights complaints so as to provide courts and 
other readers of legal argument with a deeper understanding of the injustices being alleged).  In the 
Freedom of Information Act litigation described in the next section, see infra Section I.C, 
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From the crucible in Arizona, NDLON’s alliance with the dissident organ-
izers gained strength.  NDLON was involved on the ground through its Alto 
Arizona campaign in collaboration with local activists such as Salvador Reza 
with Tonatierra68 and Carlos Garcia with Puente Arizona.69  The expanding 
youth-led organizations in Southern California mobilized for protests and other 
campaign activity in Arizona on a regular basis and came to rely on NDLON’s 
logistical and organizing support.70  In Newman’s words, the campaign work in 
Arizona created a “stage” or “scaffolding” that galvanized the media’s coverage of 
events in the state.71  He also believes that the escalating street organizing ulti-
mately acted as “amicus” in the Supreme Court case.72 
C. Interior Enforcement 
For the dissident organizers, the lack of progress on CIR and the established 
advocacy organizations’ opposition to a standalone DREAM Act was juxtaposed 
with the expansion of the deportation apparatus.  Following the failed Bush 
playbook on CIR, the Obama Administration continued to escalate immigra-
tion enforcement in the interior of the country, which had been significantly 
ramped up in 1986 and then again following 9/11.73  One of the core Obama 
Administration strategies was the use of the S-Comm program to transfer targets 
efficiently from local law enforcement to ICE for detention and removal.74  
Though the Obama enforcement strategy was quieter and less performative than 
the Bush approach, it was nonetheless devastating to families and communities.  
  
NDLON and its lawyers followed Eastman’s imperative and included an expansive group of 
allegations in the federal complaint, going well beyond open records law. 
68. For information about the activist work of Tonatierra, see Movimiento Macehualli, TONATIERRA, 
http://www.tonatierra.org/movimiento-macehualli [https://perma.cc/P7WR-PU86]. 
69. For information about Puente, see Alto Arizona, PUENTE MOVEMENT, http://puenteaz.org/ 
campaigns/past-campaigns/alto-arizona [https://perma.cc/6P9V-3M26]. 
70. See NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 166. 
71. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58. 
72. Id.; cf. Linda Greenhouse, The Lower Floor, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (May 2, 2012, 9:00 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/the-lower-floor [https://perma.cc/ 
SG2R-TTCJ] (lamenting the absence of consideration for human suffering in the oral argument 
of Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)). 
73. See Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1149–68 (2008) (describing expansion of interior immigration 
enforcement since the enactment of employer sanctions in the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986). 
74. See SECURE COMMUNITIES PLAN, supra note 34, at 1. 
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Deportation levels remained at a historic high point in 2010 and 2011 and hit 
new peaks in 2012 and 2013.75 
It was challenging to formulate a strategy to oppose S-Comm.  The dichotomy 
between “good” and “bad” immigrants was a core premise of CIR advocates who 
sought to enact legislation that would offer a path to citizenship for some undoc-
umented immigrants while increasing interior enforcement resources and 
hardening the southern border with Mexico.76  S-Comm extended this dichotomy 
and sought to use local authorities more extensively to sift “bad” immigrants out 
of the undocumented population in the United States.77  The tight embrace of 
CIR by established advocacy organizations—committing them to the assumption 
that immigrants who commit crimes in the United States did not deserve a path 
to citizenship—made it difficult for them to oppose S-Comm.  Indeed, Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano’s discussion in 
2009 on the first anniversary of S-Comm focused extensively on the criminals 
and gang members purportedly targeted by the program.78  However, local 
advocates suspected, based on individual deportation cases, that the population 
being targeted for detention and deportation included many immigrants without 
significant criminal history, not just among those stopped at the border, but also 
among residents who had spent significant time in the United States.  This 
  
75. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Immigrant Deportations Declined in 2014, 
but Remain Near Record High, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/08/31/u-s-immigrant-deportations-declined-in-2014-but-remain-near-record-high 
[https://perma.cc/C5FL-ZYU2]. 
76. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 273–90 
(2017) (analyzing conditional path to citizenship in 2010 CIR legislation and the neoliberal and 
penal assumptions about undocumented people underlying those conditions); Angélica Cházaro, 
Beyond Respectability: Dismantling the Harms of “Illegality”, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 373–87 
(2015) (cataloging problematic narratives advanced in arguments for legalization); Elizabeth Keyes, 
Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 226–37 (2012) (discussing the dichotomization in immigration 
adjudication of “good” and “bad” immigrants).  But see Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The 
Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 824–35 (2007) (describing ex 
post screening of immigrants on the basis of criminal history as a rational approach to immigration 
policy-making and adjudication). 
77. S-Comm also swept in legal permanent residents (or “green card” holders) who had committed 
crimes that made them deportable under federal law.  See MICHELE WASLIN, IMMIGRATION 
POLICY CTR., THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND 
CONTINUING CONCERNS 4 (2011), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/ 
files/research/Secure_Communities_112911_updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ4Q-7U27]. 
78. See Editorial, The “Secure Communities” Illusion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/09/06/opinion/the-secure-communities-illusion.html 
[https://perma.cc/3QEP-RWX4] (indicating that Janet Napolitano, secretary of DHS, later 
walked back claims about the number of serious convicted criminals deported as a consequence of 
the program). 
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over-inclusive enforcement approach would have been consistent with the overall 
mix of deportees in the years prior, and was thought to have been advanced dur-
ing the Bush administration so that ICE agents could meet numerical arrest and 
removal goals.79 
This suspicion regarding S-Comm was shared by both NDLON and the 
dissident organizers who were closest to the families and communities affected by 
the program.  In the same month that SB 1070 was enacted in Arizona, 
NDLON, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), and the Benjamin 
Cardozo School of Law Immigration Justice Clinic (Cardozo) brought Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) litigation against the federal government in National 
Day Laborer Organization Network v. United States Immigration and Customs En-
forcement Agency.80  NDLON Legal Director Newman and Puente lead organizer 
Carlos Garcia had met CCR attorney Sunita Patel at an Open Society 
Foundations conference on the convergence of criminal justice reform and 
immigrant rights and discussed how to head “where the hockey puck is going 
to.”81  Cardozo clinic director Peter Markowitz remembers being frustrated by 
the sense that they were fighting yesterday’s battles, when new threats were im-
minent.82 
Though the complaint was focused on the release of data on arrest, detention, 
and deportations resulting from the S-Comm program, it included paragraphs 
alleging racial profiling, potential pre-textual arrests by local police, and accounts 
of low priority deportees who appeared to have committed no significant 
offense.83  NDLON lawyer Jessica Bansal called the use of FOIA in this case 
“advocacy through inquiry.”84  NDLON, CCR, and Cardozo created a website, 
“Uncover the Truth,” on which they revealed information and analysis from 
  
79. See MARGOT MENDELSON ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN 
EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 10 (2009), https://www.law.yale 
.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Clinics/wirac_CollateralDamage.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2YHK-GAJP] (describing a 1000 arrests per ICE Fugitive Operations Team quota that was 
imposed as of 2006 and correlated with a significant increase in arrests of noncriminal immigrants). 
80. 811 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The groups later brought in Mayer Brown, LLP to help 
manage the volume of documents turned over by DHS in the litigation.  NDLON was lead 
plaintiff but not an attorney of record in the case.  National Day Laborer Organization Network 
(NDLON) v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, CTR. CONST. RTS. (Aug. 7, 
2013), https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/national-day-laborer-organizing-net 
work-ndlon-v-us-immigration-and-customs [https://perma.cc/FNT8-FAPQ]. 
81. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58. 
82. Telephone Interview with Peter Markowitz, Professor, Cardozo Sch. of Law (June 28, 2016). 
83. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 12, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, 877 F. 
Supp. 2d 87 (No. 10-CV-3488). 
84. Interview with Jessica Bansal, Litigation Dir., Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, Class Lecture at 
University of California, Irvine School of Law (Feb. 21, 2013). 
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successive waves of documents released over the course of the litigation starting 
in August 2010.85  The records largely confirmed the mismatch between the pub-
lic safety rhetoric espoused by federal enforcement authorities and the actual 
population subject to detention and deportation as a result of the program.86 
The data and case stories made public through the Uncover the Truth 
campaign fueled two distinct forms of local opposition strategies.  First, local 
activists opposed the detention and removal of particular individuals by bringing 
attention to the equities that they possessed.  Even those with criminal convictions 
had families, employers, pastors, organizers, and others who would speak out on 
their behalf.  The local activists also raised particularly egregious examples of fed-
eral overreach—the attempted removal of a domestic violence victim wrongly 
arrested by local police, for example87—on social media (with the hashtag 
“Not1More”) and in traditional media.88  These individual cases were portrayed 
by activists and advocates as emblematic of S-Comm and consistent with the sta-
tistics being released through the FOIA litigation. 
The second form of local advocacy fueled by data uncovered through 
National Day Laborer Organizing Network v. United States Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement Agency was the proliferation of S-Comm opt-out campaigns in 
jurisdictions across the country.  As they learned about the mismatch between the 
anti-crime rhetoric of the program and the actual targets of enforcement, cities, 
counties, and states, encouraged by advocates and immigrant rights attorneys, were 
attempting to opt out of cooperating with federal enforcement agencies.  On 
  
85. Uncover The Truth: ICE and Police Collaborations, UNCOVERTHETRUTH.ORG, [https://perma.cc/ 
3CBM-PUTD]. 
86. NDLON nested insights from the Freedom of Information Act records in a broader report that 
includes contributions by local police officials, individuals who have been targeted for deportation, 
and community-based organizations that were monitoring rollout of the program.  See generally 
NAT’L CMTY. ADVISORY COMM’N, RESTORING COMMUNITY: A NATIONAL COMMUNITY 
ADVISORY REPORT ON ICE’S FAILED “SECURE COMMUNITIES” PROGRAM 27 (2011), 
http://altopolimigra.com/documents/FINAL-Shadow-Report-regular-print.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/E4NC-S3LR]. 
87. See, e.g., Domestic Violence Survivor Calls Police and Is Detained, Could Be Deported, #NOT1MORE, 
http://www.notonemoredeportation.com/portfolio/marcela [https://perma.cc/D8QY-KJZ4]. 
88. Local activists originated strategies with little outside guidance, particularly with regard to the 
mounting of public campaigns in cases in which individuals have no discernible relief from 
deportation.  Dozens of deportations nation-wide have been halted as a result of national 
mobilizations led by undocumented youth, who have organized mass letter-writing, call-in and 
online petitions.  These campaigns are person-specific, launched as deportation dates draw near, 
calling for a stay of deportation in the short term and amnesty in the longer term.  Genevieve 
Negrón-Gonzalez, Undocumented, Unafraid and Unapologetic: Re-articulatory Practices and Migrant 
Youth “Illegality”, 12 LATINO STUD. 259, 274 (2014).  Movement organizers have tried to capture 
their methods for new organizers and activists.  E.g., Introduction, #NOT1MORE, http://www. 
notonemoredeportation.com/resources/introduction [https://perma.cc/CYL8-YMCB] (presenting 
the introduction to a resource titled “Anti-Deportations Toolkit”). 
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May 18, 2010, San Francisco County Sheriff Mike Hennessey sent a letter to 
ICE and then-California Attorney General Jerry Brown requesting further 
information about participation in S-Comm, saying that he was “concerned 
about the unintended consequences of ICE technology.”89  In August, he wrote 
again to opt out of the program.90  Santa Clara County Counsel and the San 
Mateo County Board of Supervisors requested clarification of the participation 
requirements in that same time period.91  In response to a congressional inquiry 
in September 2010, DHS Secretary Napolitano first indicated that jurisdictions 
may opt out of S-Comm with appropriate notice.92  One month later, she revoked 
that advisal, saying: “We don’t consider Secure Communities an opt-in, opt-out 
program.”93  NDLON, CCR, and Cardozo filed for an emergency injunction on 
October 28, 2010, seeking critical documents on the ability of jurisdictions to opt 
out of S-Comm.94  The requests for nonparticipation fed the confusion within 
DHS concerning the participation rules of the flagship interior enforcement 
program.  In many ways, this political process provided a blueprint for local im-
migration enforcement organizing and the template for the “uncooperative fed-
eralism” that we see in the current efforts to create sanctuary jurisdictions.95 
  
89. Letter from Michael Hennessey, Sheriff, City & Cty. of S.F., to Edmund G. Brown, Cal. 
Attorney Gen. (May 18, 2010), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Sheriff-
Hennessey-Ltr-Opting-Out-of-S-1-Comm-5-18-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3VX-QLH7]. 
90. Letter from Michael Hennessey, Sheriff, City & Cty. of S.F., to Edmund G. Brown, Cal. 
Attorney Gen., David Venturella, Exec. Dir., DHS Office of Secure Cmtys., & Marc Rapp, Dep. 
Dir., DHS Office of Secure Cmtys. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://media1.s-nbcnews.com/i/MSNBC/ 
Sections/NEWS/z_Personal/AJohnson/Secure-Comunities-Setting-the-Record-Straight.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7CJX-58W3]. 
91. Letter from Richard Gordon, President, San Mateo Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, to John Morton, 
Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (July 21, 2010) http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2010/09/Letter-Morton-072110.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EC4-6BV9]; Letter 
from Miguel Marquez, Cty. Counsel, Cty. of Santa Clara, to David Venturella, Exec. Dir., Secure 
Cmtys. (Aug. 16, 2010), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/SCC%20County% 
20Counsel%20letter%20to%20Venturella.pdf [https://perma.cc/78VN-F77B]. 
92. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., COMMUNICATION REGARDING 
PARTICIPATION IN SECURE COMMUNITIES 12 (2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/ 
P6276.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBK9-HYCF]. 
93. Dara Lind, Why Cities Are Rebelling Against the Obama Administration’s Deportation Policies, VOX 
(June 6, 2014, 11:00 AM) http://www.vox.com/2014/6/6/5782610/secure-communities-cities-
counties-ice-dhs-obama-detainer-reform [https://perma.cc/R8H6-W8KN] (quoting Napolitano). 
94. Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration 
Customs & Enf’t Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-3488). 
95. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256 (2009) (theorizing states, sometimes disobedient, as internal critics of federal policy). 
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D. Executive Discretion 
As noted above, another major animating force in the activism against inte-
rior immigration enforcement in this period was NDLON’s Alto Arizona 
campaign.  The racial animus of Sheriff Joe Arpaio against Latinx communities 
in Arizona was clear; established advocacy organizations feared that a focus on 
Arizona would siphon resources from the campaign to pass CIR96 and prevent 
Republicans in Congress from working with them on a bipartisan bill.97  Deal-
making, in their view, appeared to rely on not offending the sensibilities of 
immigration restrictionists in and out of Congress.98  This deepened the divide 
within RIFA.  NDLON and its dissident organizing allies emphatically disa-
greed with the strategy to diminish the importance of SB 1070,99 as five other 
states—Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Utah, and Indiana—enacted copycat 
bills.100  Through its Alto Arizona Campaign, NDLON partnered with grassroots 
organizations Tonatierra and Puente in Phoenix to initiate public demonstrations.101  
Other activists also mobilized against SB 1070 and Arpaio.  Student leaders mounted 
a sit-in at the Tucson office of Senator John McCain in May 2010, especially sig-
nificant because he was seen as an ally by many within the reform coalition.102  
  
96. NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 78. 
97. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Arizona’s SB 1070, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/state-and-local-
immigration-laws/arizonas-sb-1070 [https://perma.cc/VBS6-RCDK]. 
101. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58. 
102. Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrant Students Protest at McCain Office, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/us/18dream.html [https://perma.cc/6BXX-ZLUS].  This 
was apparently the first demonstration in this wave of immigrant activism in which undocumented 
students put themselves at risk of arrest.  Id.  When asked how the decision to stage such a 
confrontational action was made, one of the sit-in participants offered this explanation: 
We wanted to take ownership of our lives and our future.  We decided to do it 
inside his office, because outside—they would close the office, lock us out.  We need 
to be in their space, it’s a direct thing, that’s the purpose of direct action.  
You need to be completely unafraid and face your biggest fear.  Putting ourselves 
in front of a huge obstacle.  Doing it face to face.  Going to his office. 
 Negrón-Gonzalez, supra note 88, at 271.  The specter of arrest and possible deportation of 
undocumented students hung over every civil disobedience action undertaken by the dissident 
organizers.  There were committed attorneys, particularly immigration defense specialists, who 
strongly counseled undocumented youth to stay away from direct action protests at various points 
in the development of these campaigns.  See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Anatomy of a Deferred-Action 
Dream, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 14, 2012, 8:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000 
872396390443982904578046951916986168 (“‘I told them not to walk, because it was too risky,’ 
says Cheryl Little, an immigrant-rights attorney.  She worried that they would face arrest and 
possible deportation.”). 
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Dream Team Los Angeles103 occupied the federal building on Wilshire Boulevard 
later that May and shut down a busy thoroughfare.104  Nine students and their 
allies were arrested in the demonstration.105  Groups of student leaders across the 
country began hunger strikes.106  Los Angeles activists, led by Neidi Dominguez 
and others, organized a Freedom DREAM Ride to Washington, D.C. that culmi-
nated in the occupation of an atrium and individual Senate offices on July 20, 
2010.107  Twenty-one undocumented students were arrested.108  That same day, 
immigrant rights activist Carlos Amador and eight others began a fifteen-day 
hunger strike outside of Senator Dianne Feinstein’s Los Angeles office.109 
That summer, the split within RIFA broke open.  After RIFA leadership 
asked NILC and its affiliate United We Dream (UWD), a significant 
DREAMer organization with affiliates across the country,110 to tone down their 
support for a stand-alone bill,111 UWD came to support the dissident position in 
favor of a standalone DREAM Act.112  The Los Angeles-based immigration 
advocacy group Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA) tried to 
persuade youth activists in Los Angeles who had come up through their networks 
to stick with RIFA and CIR and indicated that they were selfish if they were 
supporting a standalone DREAM Act.113  Nicholls keenly identified the dynamic 
widening the split between the dominant groups in RIFA and the dissident 
organizers: 
The strategy of top-down centralization was an appropriate and 
sophisticated effort to maximize advantages within the particular 
  
  Undocumented activists themselves wrestled with the risks of participating in movement 
activity.  See, e.g., Jesus, On Civil Disobedience, DREAMERS ADRIFT (Aug. 21, 2011), http:// 
dreamersadrift.com/jesus-musings/on-civil-disobedience# [https://perma.cc/DS8G-PKH4]. 
103. DREAM Team Los Angeles is a grassroots organization which “aims to create a safe space in 
which undocumented immigrants from the community and allies empower themselves through 
activism and life stories.”  About, DREAM TEAM L.A., http://dreamteamla.org/about-2/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4FC2-FCTM]. 




106. Julianne Hing, How Undocumented Youth Nearly Made Their DREAMs Real in 2010, 
COLORLINES (Dec. 20, 2010, 10:21 AM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/how-undocu 
mented-youth-nearly-made-their-dreams-real-2010 [https://perma.cc/9UDR-8PCZ]. 




111. NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 76. 
112. See id. at 87–88. 
113. Id. at 88–89. 
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context.  However, the strategy had two major drawbacks: first the act 
of maintaining discipline over a diverse movement aggravated powerful 
conflicts within it.  While DREAMers and antienforcement activists 
were drawn into other battles, RIFA placed great pressure on them to 
focus all their attention on the passage of comprehensive reform.  
Rather than corralling these dissenters, RIFA’s actions only accelerated 
their separation.  Second, when political opportunities did not materi-
alize, the centralization strategy proved to be inflexible. . . . Instead of 
shifting to different fronts, RIFA doubled-down and committed itself 
to a costly strategy that was bearing no fruits.  This strengthened the 
hand of critics and dissidents, which precipitated the decline of RIFA 
and its strategy of movement centralization.114 
The dissident organizers were successfully originating a set of mobilization 
methods and distinct strategic goals.  They were finding a voice of their own, 
independent of the better-resourced wings of RIFA.115 
By fall 2010, the ground had shifted significantly, such that RIFA stalwarts 
CHIRLA, Center for Community Change, America’s Voice, and National 
Council of La Raza began to support the standalone DREAM Act.116  However, 
in light of their recent hostility to the dissident position, student leaders 
distrusted the motives of the mainstream advocates.117  Meanwhile, Democratic 
Majority Leader Harry Reid was unable to muster the sixty votes he needed to 
prevent a filibuster of a standalone DREAM Act in the lame duck session at the 
end of 2010.118 
The S-Comm opt-out campaign expanded as NDLON, CCR, and 
Cardozo pushed for relevant documents through the litigation.  Opposition to 
the program gained momentum in a series of developments in the first half of 
2011.  In a January 2011 report, the Migration Policy Institute, a D.C.-based 
think tank, warned of the probability of racial profiling and pre-textual arrests: 
“Indeed, Secure Communities may even be more susceptible to this problem 
since there are no formal agreements defining the activities of participating law 
enforcement agencies, and local officers do not receive federal training in immi-
gration enforcement.”119  DHS Secretary Napolitano was pressed on S-Comm in 
  
114. Id. at 166. 
115. Id. at 16–17 (“Being able to speak in the public sphere was viewed as a precondition of equality, so 
the act of representing became not simply a means to an end, as the association believed, but rather 
an end in its own right.”). 
116. Id. at 90–91. 
117. Id. at 91. 
118. Jordan, supra note 102. 
119. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A 
STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 49 (2011), http://www. 
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a March meeting with dissident activists, including Natalia Aristizabal, who 
pointed out that DREAMers were being deported.120  In May 2011, Congress-
woman Zoe Lofgren requested an investigation by the DHS Inspector General 
as to the focus of the program on “dangerous criminal aliens, . . . the accuracy of 
ICE’s data collection, [and] the controversy regarding communities’ requirement 
to participate and the ability to ‘opt-out’ of the program.”121  Also in May, the 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus called on the President to suspend S-Comm, 
saying “evidence reveals not only a striking dissonance between the program’s 
stated purpose of removing dangerous criminals and its actual effect; it also sug-
gests that S-Comm may endanger the public, particularly among communities of 
color.”122  The politics surrounding S-Comm had shifted significantly. 
The local opt-out campaigns gained strength in several large states.  Illinois 
terminated its S-Comm agreement with DHS in May 2011;123 New York 
suspended its participation one month later.124  Massachusetts declined to sign a 
memorandum of agreement with DHS with regard to its participation in S-
Comm, noting concerns about racial profiling and nonreporting of criminal ac-
tivity.125  In California, a bill to minimize the collaboration of local criminal 
justice agencies with federal authorities—the TRUST Act126—was making its 
way through the legislature, supported by NDLON and other close institutional 




120. Jordan, supra note 102. 
121. Letter from Zoe Lofgren, U.S. Congress, to Charles K. Edwards, Acting DHS Inspector Gen., & 
Timothy Moynihan, Assistant Dir., Office of Prof’l Responsibilty, Immigration & Customs Enf’t 
(May 17, 2011), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/letter-to-cadman-re-scomm-w-encls-redacted-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVH3-BYJT] (quoting Letter from Charles K. Edwards, Acting DHS 
Inspector Gen., to Zoe Lofgren, U.S. Congress (May 10, 2011), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/ 
letter-to-cadman-re-scomm-w-encls-redacted-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVH3-BYJT]). 
122. Letter from Charles A. Gonzalez, Chairman, Cong. Hispanic Caucus, to Barack Obama, U.S. 
President (May 5, 2011), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/05-05-11-
SCOMM-Letter-to-President.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GA9-RHPX]. 
123. Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (May 
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06immigration.html [https://perma.cc/DQR8 
-9FVZ]. 
124. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Cuomo Suspends Participation in Federal Secure 
Communities Program (June 1, 2011), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-
suspends-participation-federal-secure-communities-program [https://perma.cc/RD3B-6AAR]. 
125. Letter from Mary Elizabeth Heffernan, Sec’y, Mass. Exec. Office of Pub. Safety & Sec., to Marc 
Rapp, Acting Dir. Secure Comtys. (June 3, 2011), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/ 
Massachusetts_Rapp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYE4-SUD4]. 
126. Assemb. B. 4, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282–
7282.5 (West Supp. 2017)). 
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state.127  One of the immigrant youth organizers working to pass the TRUST 
Act articulated a strong intersectional commitment to the struggle against 
federal-local immigration enforcement: 
It has been a broad coalition.  We had a conversation about what the 
focus of this coalition should be and we agreed that it should be broad, 
and should focus on criminalization and not just immigration. . . . 
That would allow all of those [nonimmigrant] organizations . . . to 
contribute to this work and put that in their grants.  It would also open 
up the coalition and really bring in the social justice work that’s going 
on, in terms of youth, homeless, and those other perspectives.  
NDLON supported this but didn’t want to water down the 287(g) 
and Secure Communities point of the coalition either.  IDEPSCA 
and the normal orgs were at the same table: we can target 287(g) and 
Secure Communities but do it through a critique of criminalization.  
It’s part of getting to that bigger picture.128 
In mid-June 2011, ICE announced changes to S-Comm that critics 
characterized as “cosmetic.”129  In the same month, the Obama Administration 
  
127. See Walter J. Nicholls et al., The Networked Grassroots.  How Radicals Outflanked Reformists in the 
United States’ Immigrant Rights Movement, 42 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1036, 1048 
(2016); see also Gabriel San Roman, Undocumented Caravan Stops in OC Today Along Its Statewide 
Pro-TRUST Act Trip, OC WEEKLY (June 26, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.ocweekly.com/news/ 
undocumented-caravan-stops-in-oc-today-along-its-statewide-pro-trust-act-trip-6471864 
[https://perma.cc/S6TU-T5SA] (noting participation of NDLON and local youth-led activist 
organization RAIZ in the campaign for the TRUST Act in Orange County). 
128. NICHOLLS, supra note 17, at 157 (first omission in original) (emphasis omitted).  For a description 
of the 287(g) program, see RANDY CAPPS ET AL., supra note 119, at 1, which discusses federal 
delegation of authority to state and local officers to perform immigration enforcement.  The 
criminalization frame was an important link between the new movement-centered wing of 
immigrant rights advocacy and the Movement for Black Lives that would form after the killing of 
Michael Brown in 2014.  Sociologist Ruth Milkman traces methodological and conceptual 
continuities (including a focus on intersectional analysis) across four movements of millennials in 
the aftermath of the 2008 recession: Dreamers, Occupy Wall Street, the campus movement 
protesting sexual assault, and Black Lives Matter.  Ruth Milkman, A New Political Generation: 
Millennials and the Post-2008 Wave of Protest, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 10–25 (2016); see also Michelle 
Chen, Phillip Agnew, Dream Defender, THESE TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015), http://inthesetimes.com/ 
article/17543/ phillip_agnew_dream_defender [https://perma.cc/SB7M-AHKL] (describing link 
between Black Lives Matter and Occupy Wall Street).  Immigrant activists also appeared to draw 
from a shared understanding of the African-American civil rights movement.  See Negrón-
Gonzalez, supra note 88, at 268 (describing inspiration drawn by undocumented activists from 
Rosa Parks and Cesar Chavez). 
129. The changes proposed by ICE included new memos on prosecutorial discretion, the creation of an 
advisory committee, a video on S-Comm for law enforcement, tasking the understaffed DHS 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties with responding to S-Comm complaints, and changes 
to the ICE detainer form.  The Uncover the Truth campaign catalogued these changes and 
critiqued their efficacy in a June 2011 memorandum.  UNCOVER THE TRUTH, BRIEFING GUIDE 
TO ICE’S MINOR “SECURE COMMUNITIES” MODIFICATIONS (2011), http://uncoverthetruth. 
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announced that low-priority immigrant offenders would not be targeted for 
deportation under new guidelines.130  In November, the Administration com-
mitted to a case-by-case review of approximately 300,000 cases of undocumented 
immigrants already in removal proceedings, allowing those who posed no threat 
to society to remain in the country.131  Although the selective exercise of discre-
tion may have been intended to prop up S-Comm, it also provided a new path 
toward relief in the face of legislative inaction on any kind of immigration 
reform.132  UCLA Law Professor Hiroshi Motomura recalls that the turn toward 
executive action was a contested one within the reform coalition: “[L]ooking 
back at [it], the broadening of advocacy to this certain administrative relief was 
something that was initiated more from [the] grassroots . . . that happened while 
NILC for example, was still trying to figure out exactly how to balance [legislative 
and administrative strategies].”133  Activists such as Neidi Dominguez believed 
that this path held promise and organizers on both coasts enlisted attorneys to 
make the legal case for a categorical grant of deferred action to DREAMers.134 
The effort to secure executive relief gained momentum after Senator Marco 
Rubio announced his intention to propose legislation that would provide 
nonimmigrant visas, but not citizenship, to undocumented youth.135  One of the 
original four student leaders who had walked the Trail of DREAMS in 2010, 
Gaby Pacheco, was at the center of subsequent negotiations, along with other 
organizers.136  After meeting with Senator Rubio’s chief of staff, Pacheco and her 
colleagues walked to Senator Durbin’s office to seek Democratic support for the 
  
org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/S-Comm-Adjustment-Analysis-20110624.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/Y269-WD97] (“This briefing guide analyzes the cosmetic adjustments proposed by ICE and 
explains why they are woefully inadequate to solve the problems with this troubled deportation 
program.”). 
130. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enf’t (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/pro 
secutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT79-HDFW]. 
131. See Julia Preston, U.S. to Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/us/deportation-cases-of-illegal-immigrants-to-be-re 
viewed.html [https://perma.cc/S8NL-AFNV]. 
132. DHS Secretary Napolitano now characterized the exercise of categorical discretion as an extension 
of S-Comm rather than in any way undermining the program.  Telephone Interview with Chris 
Newman, supra note 58.  Eventually, even Administration officials acknowledged that the 
campaigns against S-Comm had created space for them to advocate for administrative relief 
internally.  Id. 
133. Telephone Interview with Hiroshi Motomura, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law (June 27, 2016). 
134. Jordan, supra note 102.  MALDEF President and General Counsel Tom Saenz also had a key role 
in validating a categorical discretionary approach.  Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra 
note 58. 
135. Jordan, supra note 102. 
136. Id. 
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Rubio proposal.137  They then went to meet with Obama Senior Advisor Valerie 
Jarrett and White House Domestic Policy Council Director Cecilia Muñoz.138  
UWD’s Lorella Praeli indicated in the meeting that they had legal analysis that 
supported their position—that they “were well-armed.”139  Jarrett promised to 
schedule a meeting between the activists and White House attorneys.140  
NDLON Legal Director Newman thinks that the meeting with Rubio’s office 
and the Administration’s awareness of that meeting was a turning point in the 
debate within the White House, as officials came to realize that they were dealing 
with an “unconstrained opposition” in an election year.141 
After rallies outside of detention centers, federal buildings, and Obama 
campaign offices on May 17—as well as increasing pressure on Napolitano to fix 
the mismatch between the Administration’s stated goals and its actual apprehen-
sion and deportation policy—the activists got their meeting with attorneys from 
the White House.  Lawyers helped movement leaders prepare.  Leaders met in 
Los Angeles with their lawyers from NDLON, MALDEF, NILC, and the Yale 
Law School Worker and Immigrant Rights Advocacy Clinic.142  On May 25, 
Napolitano apparently stunned her staff by suggesting that they exercise discre-
tionary relief for all of those who would have benefitted from the DREAM 
Act.143  When UCLA law professor Motomura volunteered to draft a letter on 
May 28 outlining the historical precedent for the exercise of executive discretion 
with NDLON attorney Jessica Bansal and several others, he thought of his clients 
as being “the loose group of students who were pushing for this.”144  The activists 
brought their lawyers—Bansal from NDLON, Betty Hung from Asian 
Americans Advancing Justice, Florida immigration defense attorney Cheryl Little, 
and Yale clinic director Muneer Ahmad—to the May 29 meeting145 in Washing-
ton and indicated that they wanted an answer on whether the Administration 
would act by mid-June; if it did not act, they would “escalate.”146  Napolitano 
shared details about a discretionary relief plan with White House officials on 






141. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58. 
142. Interview with Hiroshi Motomura, supra note 133. 
143. Jordan, supra note 102. 
144. Interview with Hiroshi Motomura, supra note 133. 
145. Interview with Jessica Bansal, supra note 84. 
146. Jordan, supra note 102. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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that the convergence of outside pressure and Napolitano’s vigorous support within 
the administration made executive relief palatable within the White House.  
President Obama announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals on 
June 15, 2012.149  And so began another phase in the fight for immigrant rights. 
II. RESISTANCE AND AGENCY 
Undocumented youth and leading organizers were the protagonists of the 
story just told.150  They did in some ways what we might expect them to do based 
on the closely observed accounts of laypeople confronting legality in all of its 
manifestations, formal and informal.  But they also upset expectations as they 
fought to express their “contentious citizenship.”151  This Part places the actions 
of activists and their lawyers in the fight for immigrant rights within the socio-
legal framework of law and resistance and extends that literature.  The immigrant 
rights struggle reveals a process of resistance to law, one that begins and ends with 
courageous activists but that incorporates creative and committed lawyers.  This 
Part focuses on the role of lawyers in the process of social movement-based 
resistance to law; the next and final Part of this Article focuses on the social 
resources co-generated through collaborations between organizers and lawyers in 
the fight for immigrant rights. 
A. Resisting Legality 
The legal academic literature is replete with references to lawyers suppressing 
or usurping the agency of the less privileged people that they represent.152  The 
  
149. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 12. 
150. Cf. Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law, and Social 
Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133, 2140–41 (2007) (describing community lawyering model in 
which client groups rather than lawyers are the protagonists in campaigns for social change). 
151. Kathryn Abrams, Contentious Citizenship: Undocumented Activism in the Not1More Deportation 
Campaign, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 46, 64 (2016) (describing the increasingly contentious 
character of undocumented activism).  Abrams, in describing undocumented activism as 
“contentious,” draws on the work of social movement theorists Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly.  
See generally SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2d ed. 1998); CHARLES TILLY, THE CONTENTIOUS FRENCH (1986). 
152. See, e.g., LÓPEZ, supra note 7; Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty, supra note 9; Michelle S. Jacobs, People 
From the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 345 (1997); White, supra note 8; see also, e.g., COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING 
JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR 
SOCIAL CHANGE 163–65 (2009) (critiquing the critical mind-set in scholarship on public interest 
lawyering); Lauren B. Edelman et al., On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 653, 663 (2010) (“[L]awyers direct movement activity into legal channels, 
potentially snuffing out sustained collective action in favor of ‘associations without members.’” 
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critical urge that swept left legal scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s has had 
resounding influence on the development of the progressive, public interest seg-
ment of the legal profession.153  The scope of public interest law since the Reagan 
Administration has been constrained significantly by cutbacks in governmental 
funding and restraints on the avenues by which to contest the significant social 
problems that confront poor clients.  The profession has reacted to external disci-
pline by pulling back from larger social engineering projects and retrenching in 
the cloistered work of individual representation.  It reflected what Joel Handler 
evocatively—if not precisely—called the postmodern turn away from transforma-
tional politics.154  The studies (and the law school pedagogy) bore in on the 
microcosmic psychological implications of the lawyer-client relationship.155 
Within the socio-legal literature, there was a related shift to discern and 
document the phenomenon of “everyday resistance.”156  The scholars who consid-
ered the issue had a rich understanding of law as not existing outside of social life, 
but instead as embedded “within the tapestry of ordinary lives and everyday 
events.”157  Austin Sarat found that, much as for the undocumented activists who 
led the three-year fight for DACA, the individuals that he interviewed in welfare 
offices were unyieldingly enmeshed in legal rules and practices, with significant 
portions of their lives under the jurisdiction of arbitrary bureaucrats and vulnerable 
to the predations of private actors.158  For these individuals, the law is “an enclo-
sure seen from the inside.”159  People are excluded from participating in the 
  
(quoting Theda Skocpol, Associations Without Members, AM. PROSPECT, July–Aug. 1999, at 66 
(1999))); id. at 665 (“[L]egally institutionalized frames may also influence the activists that use 
them in subtle and disabling ways.”). 
153. Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 443, 450–69 (2001). 
154. Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 697, 
710–16 (1992).  But see Michael W. McCann, Resistance, Reconstruction, and Romance in Legal 
Scholarship, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 733, 734–37 (1992) (criticizing Handler’s incomplete and 
undertheorized use of post-modernism). 
155. Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 380–83 
(2008); William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 
487, 525–59 (1980). 
156. JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 12 (2001) (emphasis added); see Anna-Maria Marshall & Scott Barclay, In 
Their Own Words: How Ordinary People Construct the Legal World, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 617, 621 
(2003) (“More recently, legal consciousness research has shifted away from this ‘institutionally 
centered, law-first perspective’ in favor of a focus on everyday life in commonplace locations like 
workplaces, schools, and neighborhoods.” (quoting PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE 
COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 20 (1998))); see, e.g., Richard A. 
Brisbin, Jr., Resistance to Legality, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 25 (2010). 
157. Ewick & Silbey, Conformity, supra note 5, at 732. 
158. See Sarat, supra note 6, at 344. 
159. Id. at 345. 
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constructions of legality through which they are oppressed.160  Sarat’s subjects are 
able to find narrow spaces in which to contest bureaucratic decision-making, par-
ticularly if they have the assistance of willing legal services attorneys.  However, 
they believed that their lawyers were an important component of state oppression, 
operating through “regulation and internal surveillance rather than prohibition 
and punishment.”161  Lawyers have the power to assist those subject to law if they 
deign to do so and possess the power to correct mistakes, but they lack the capacity 
to take apart the bureaucratic structure within which they themselves are also 
trapped.162 
Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey redefined legality to include a broader 
range of engagements within and without formal legal contexts.163  They argued 
that people had the capacity to “identify the cracks and vulnerabilities of institu-
tionalized power,”164 expose social structure, and perhaps momentarily reverse the 
usual direction in which that power flowed.165  Kathryn Abrams’s more recent 
accounts of undocumented youth activists in Phoenix and Chicago tell a parallel 
story about resistance to legality.  Undocumented youth perform a “contentious 
citizenship” by taking on the responsibilities of national belonging—participating 
politically, contesting policies and practices, and reshaping public discourse—
while remaining without de jure recognition as citizens and under the constant 
threat of arrest and deportation.166  Abrams thinks that both the hybrid position 
of undocumented youth, with strong claims to membership, and the rising local 
activism in the period on which she is focused (just after the end of the narrative 
in Part I of this Article) might explain their resistance and political agency.167 
In Sarat’s account of enclosed subjects, lawyers are unreliable actors embedded 
within an oppressive bureaucracy.  In Ewick and Silbey’s and Abrams’s narratives, 
lawyers are not quite visible, as individuals create moments of agency against 
institutionalized power.168  The fight for immigrant rights described in this Article 
reveals a different process of resistance to legality, one that draws on the courage 
and creativity of those who are subject to law, acting in conjunction with move-
ment lawyers. 
  
160. See id. at 377. 
161. Id. at 353. 
162. Id. 
163. Ewick & Silbey, Narrating, supra note 5, at 1340 n.6. 
164. Id. at 1330. 
165. See id. at 1329–31. 
166. See Abrams, supra note 151, at 66–69. 
167. Id. at 62–63; see supra Part I. 
168. But see Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 551, 
573–88 (2011) (interpreting emotional responses of claimants and implications for lawyering). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079764
Movement Lawyers 1493 
 
B. Reconstructing Legality 
Undocumented activists have fought for inclusion through legalization even 
as they are banned by the state.169  Past legal regimes, such as Jim Crow-era states 
and localities in the American South, have suppressed the articulation of 
membership claims by criminalizing otherwise constitutional speech and 
conduct.170  The inherent, relatively unchecked capaciousness of immigration law 
allows federal executive authority to blur the line between criminal and resister,171 
just as sheriffs did in response to civil rights organizing campaigns.172  The 
undocumented are discouraged from making affirmative legal claims, and the 
state attempts to deport them as expeditiously as possible.173  Intersecting immi-
gration and criminal legal regimes expose immigrants without formal or certain 
legal status to various forms of legal violence in homes, workplaces, and 
schools.174  Being placed outside of the polity pushes many undocumented 
Americans to live in fear or with a sense of stigma.175 
  
169. See Leisy J. Abrego, Legal Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos: Fear and Stigma as Barriers to 
Claims-Making for First- and 1.5-Generation Immigrants, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 337, 364 (2011). 
170. See Steven E. Barkan, Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 552, 
554 (1984) (“The entire legal machinery of the South became a tool for social control of civil rights 
protest.”); cf. WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE 
FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 
MOVEMENT 37–62 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the FBI’s practice of constantly arresting activist 
leaders to “simply harass, increase paranoia, tie up activists in a series of [criminal defense 
proceedings], and deplete their resources” while also fabricating or withholding evidence). 
171. See supra notes 19 & 77 and accompanying text.  Richard Brisbin distinguishes resistance to legality 
from criminality by defining the latter as conduct motivated by an individual’s desire for material 
goods or attention.  Brisbin, supra note 156, at 27.  The resister, on the other hand, “desires to 
become included in the community governed by law or other norms.”  Id.  This distinction is nearly 
meaningless in contexts in which individuals are disproportionately and inaccurately subject to 
policing and criminalization.  See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 43 (2009) (arguing that the level of policing within a certain community is a function 
of racial segregation). 
172. Barkan, supra note 170, at 556–59, 560–62. 
173. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 220–
31 (2017) (describing the increasing use by the federal government in the latter years of the Obama 
Administration of mechanisms by which to remove immigrants with even less legal process than 
available in overwhelmed immigration courts). 
174. See Cecilia Menjívar & Leisy Abrego, Legal Violence: Immigration Law and the Lives of Central 
American Immigrants, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1380, 1388–91 (2012) (documenting the effects of 
immigration law in the life experiences of undocumented Central Americans in the United States). 
175. See Abrego, supra note 169, at 354 (“When fear and stigma centrally inform the legal consciousness 
of undocumented immigrants, both sentiments can stand as barriers to claim-making.”); id. at 362–
63 (describing differing life experiences and asymmetric rights claiming by segments of the 
undocumented population in the United States). 
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Against this backdrop, undocumented activists “claim their rights within 
and against the law.”176  In the immigration field, there was a clear “endogenous 
shift and consciousness change,”177 whereby undocumented activists took control 
of both the message and the means of their own advocacy, for themselves, their 
families, and their communities.  The “exogenous shock” that likely spurred that 
shift178 was the near-simultaneity of the enactment of SB 1070 in Arizona, the 
collective exhaustion of patience for CIR, and the expansion of S-Comm.  In this 
period, undocumented activists collectively bared their illegality and began to 
perform their “contentious citizenship.”179  A period of contestation within the 
immigrant advocacy sector followed, during which there was uncertainty and 
mobilization by both incumbents and challengers for strategic control of the 
movement.180 
Undocumented activists came to resist legality through public expression, 
collectivity, and solidarity.  Individual stories about injustice and exclusion 
became movement stories that mobilized participation.181  The network of 
organizations which they joined or formed collaborated with movement lawyers 
to reconstruct legality.  Movement organizations sought to challenge the policy 
presumptions of incumbent actors in both government and the advocacy sector.  
They worked with lawyers to support policy prescriptions, such as categorical dis-
cretionary relief from the threat of deportation, which earlier had been deemed 
unworkable.  They fought S-Comm by matching community narratives with data 
generated through open records litigation; this methodology led to media 
advocacy and local jurisdictional opt-out campaigns.  They began to reconstruct 
legality and did so by changing law on the books, challenging enforcement prac-
tices at the local level, and forcing the exercise of categorical discretion at the federal 
level. 
In contrast to the absent lawyers in the Ewick and Sibley narratives or the 
coopted legal services attorneys in the Sarat story, organizers and activists in 
the youth-led movement—who themselves were exercising their agency within 
the immigrant advocacy sector—collaborated with lawyers to create a space for 
  
176. Helge Schwiertz, Transformations of the Undocumented Youth Movement and Radical Egalitarian 
Citizenship, 20 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 610, 624 (2016). 
177. Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 674. 
178. Id. 
179. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the term “contentious 
citizenship”). 
180. See Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 671 (setting forth the features for social movement 
organizations of episodes of contention within a movement). 
181. See Ewick & Silbey, Narrating, supra note 5, at 1363–65 (arguing that individual stories may not 
cause social change but are part of a sociocultural stream that begin to uncover social structures of 
injustice). 
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themselves within the polity, as protected from federal detention and deportation 
and as fully engaged participants in local and state politics.  This process suggests 
an alternative understanding of resistance to legality with a multi-faceted role for 
movement lawyers in the existential reconstruction efforts undertaken by undoc-
umented activists.  It also suggests a collective and solidaristic approach to re-
sistance not fully contemplated in this part of the sociolegal literature.182  The 
mutually constitutive relationship built by lawyers and activists in the course of 
resistance and reconstruction is the core generator of the relational features 
outlined in the next Part. 
III. MOVEMENT LAWYERING 
As set out in the preceding Part, lawyers have an essential role in the process 
of resistance to legality and the subsequent reconstruction of law and social 
discourse.  Within public interest law, between the impact litigator and the lawyer 
turned community organizer, there lies a middle field in which movement 
lawyers both deploy conventional legal tools and mechanisms while nurturing 
critical visions by which to alter law and social discourse.  They do this work by 
the means described below. 
Jennifer Gordon describes the lawyers who came to work at the United 
Farm Workers under General Counsel Jerry Cohen, as relatively free of attach-
ments to law and rules as they were, as well as of conventional institutional 
constraints and, thus, able to “figure out ways of generating the kind of power 
that’s needed.”183  Lawyers who worked on the campaigns against S-Comm and 
for DACA appear to have enjoyed a similar freedom to innovate due to their 
institutional homes and their transformative relationships with movement ac-
tivists.  They brought both their own formative experiences and a willingness to 
experiment with regard to the form and substance of their work.  They made a 
role for themselves that was most certainly constituted by the systems in which 
they had been educated and had worked up to that point, but also opened 
themselves to rich relationships with organizers and activists and allowed the 
  
182. Guinier and Torres note that “[s]ociologists, political scientists, and historians have long studied 
social movements, yet their theories of social change also separate the role of law and lawyers, as if 
lawyers and social movements function on parallel but distinctive tracks.”  Lani Guinier & Gerald 
Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demoprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2740, 2802 (2014).  The critical legal academic scholarship on public interest lawyering better 
capture: (1) the dialogic relationships between law, lawyers, and social movements; and (2) the 
mechanics of how those relationships actually works. 
183. Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s 
and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 48 (2005) 
(quoting United Federal Workers General Counsel Jerry Cohen). 
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political moment to challenge their assumptions and ideas.  As Gordon says 
about the United Farm Workers lawyers: “The convergence of the times and the 
legal context created a set of opportunities that others had not recognized.”184  
This Part spotlights key features of the work of these contemporary movement 
lawyers, who worked collaboratively with activists to advance a network of affiliated 
social movement organizations and to alter the public discourse on immigration 
enforcement. 
In the 2009–2012 mobilization, two threads of lawyering documented 
within the historical civil rights literature185 were evident: (1) establishment lawyers 
(and their corresponding organizational clients) operating within a superstructure 
set by preexisting distributions of political power using more moderate discursive 
framing; and (2) a recessive strand of the legal profession that sought to challenge 
the superstructure through the support of activist capacity building and the use of 
more critical discursive frames.186  It becomes clear in both historical and 
contemporary accounts that the divide between establishment lawyers and 
recessive-strand lawyers is not tactical.  That is, lawyers in both threads used a 
full repertoire of lawyering tactics that included litigation and non-litigation ad-
vocacy.187  Though the lawyers may bring different degrees of emphasis to legal 
mobilization tools, all of them have an expansive understanding of the legal levers 
that can be pulled to achieve social change and are among the most effective in 
their fields. 
This Part delineates distinctive features of movement lawyering in the fight 
for immigrant rights, to suggest a set of understandings shared by the movement 
lawyers described in this Article and to extend the critical legal academic literature 
on public interest lawyering.  Lawyers helped develop critical ideas and organiza-
tional infrastructure, generated resources for organizing, and accompanied 
movement leaders and constituents.  Though my focus in this Article—with the 
aim of filling a gap in the literature—is on what lawyers did and how that helped 
advance successive campaigns for social change, the features described below are 
  
184. Id. at 50. 
185. See, e.g., BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 11, at 175–211 (describing tensions between the approaches 
of the NAACP and NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund-affiliated lawyers versus that of 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress of Racial Equality, the 
Committee on Appeal of Human Rights, and lawyers affiliated with the National Lawyers Guild 
(NLG)). 
186. Id.  This split within the legal profession is reflected in the description by Richard Brisbin of how 
subjects resist legality, some with an “inside” strategy that reinforces the legitimacy of the regime 
and others with a more confrontational and unsettling “outside” strategy that attempts to challenge 
foundational distributions of power.  Brisbin, supra note 156, at 30–31. 
187. See Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 62, 70–
71 (2007). 
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dialogic,188 that is they became manifest or were co-generated in the context of 
formal and informal relationships marked by equality and mutuality. 
A. Critical Infrastructure 
At bottom, the theory of social change advanced by movement lawyers relies 
on the deployment of legal tactics that emphasize the development of grassroots 
and activist agency in justice campaigns.189  There were two forms of critical 
infrastructure that advanced activist agency in this mobilization narrative: (1) 
ideational;190 and (2) organizational.  The “exogenous shocks” to immigrant 
organizing and the turn from CIR to immigration enforcement necessitated the 
development of new critical ideas untethered from the assumptions of established 
advocacy organizations.191  The corresponding endogenous shifts within existing 
social movement organizations and the formation of new organizations required 
material support.192  Movement lawyers had a role in both of these processes.  
Both the classic texts from the critical legal academic literature on public interest 
lawyering,193 as well as newer iterations, such as the recent work on 
“demoprudence” by Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, extol the authorial and 
interpretive work of non-lawyers who are themselves subject to conditions of 
injustice and exclusion.194  This insight is essential.  Guinier and Torres suggest 
that some movement actors are represented by lawyers,195 but they pay less atten-
tion to the role of lawyers in facilitating critical ideation by movement actors.  
Movement lawyers help build narratives that offer a universe of actors to name, 
  
188. See RICHARD SENNETT, TOGETHER: THE RITUALS, PLEASURES AND POLITICS OF CO-
OPERATION 18–20 (2012) (distinguishing between dialogic and dialectic collaboration, the 
former emphasizing presence and listening, the latter marked by competition and closure). 
189. See Betty Hung, Essay—Law and Organizing From the Perspective of Organizers: Finding a Shared 
Theory of Social Change, 1 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 4, 19–23 (2009) (arguing that successful lawyer-
organizer collaborations possess a shared a theory of social change). 
190. My conceptualization of critical ideation is informed by the work of Amna Akbar on how the 
Movement for Black Lives challenges and reconceives law.  See generally Amna A. Akbar, Law’s 
Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352 (2015); Amna A. Akbar, 
Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).  My 
conceptualization also owes a great debt to Robert Cover’s foundational work on “jurisgenesis” in a 
“jurispathic” state.  Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term–Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
191. See Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 675 (advancing an exogenous shock/endogenous shift 
framework for social movement organizations in dynamic contexts). 
192. See id. 
193. See sources cited supra notes 7–9. 
194. Guinier & Torres, supra note 182, at 2781–82. 
195. Id. 
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blame, and claim against.196  This is significant, so that “resistance becomes not 
just action against legality but action against those believed to have caused [resis-
tors’] legal disadvantages.”197 
When Arizona politicians and law enforcement authorities started enacting 
and enforcing anti-immigrant policies, movement lawyers with NDLON, 
MALDEF, and the ACLU of Arizona gravitated toward local activists and 
helped to support the organizations that they built with their grassroots collabo-
rators.198  Organizers, activists, and movement constituents—not lawyers—were 
the face of the campaign in the media and with funders.199  The critical discursive 
framing of restrictionism in Arizona, with an explicit critique of white supremacist 
law enforcement, came to the fore in media accounts.  Movement actors and 
lawyers had critical exchanges in defining and framing what was occurring on the 
ground in Arizona and sought to bring that understanding into the broader public 
consciousness through protest and media advocacy.  Lawyers helped support the 
construction of new immigrant advocacy organizations at the grassroots and 
advanced activist framing of what was happening nationally with elected officials, 
allies, funders, and journalists. 
As youth activists grew uncomfortable with both the DREAMer narrative 
and the continued support of established advocacy organizations for CIR legisla-
tion that would intensify immigration enforcement, movement lawyers helped 
reinforce critical and solidaristic narratives.200  Day laborers were “the most pre-
carious and stigmatized of the undocumented population.”201  The commitment 
of the lawyers at NDLON, MALDEF, and the UCLA Labor Center to this 
group202 led them to share the activists’ critique of DREAMer exceptionalism 
and to develop solidaristic commitments in their advocacy; these lawyers 
  
196. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635–37 (1980–81) (setting out a framework in which 
individual actions to generate disputes define law); Deborah Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation 
of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 281, 289–93 (suggesting that the advancement of causal stories 
yields particular policy solutions). 
197. Brisbin, supra note 156, at 29. 
198. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58; E-mail from Annie Lai, supra note 66.  I 
discuss this choice further in Section III.C. 
199. Telephone Interview with Chris Newman, supra note 58. 
200. See supra Section I.C. 
201. Walter Nicholls, Politicizing Undocumented Immigrants One Corner at a Time: How Day Laborers 
Became a Politically Contentious Group, 40 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 299, 299, 305 (2016). 
202. Nicholls et al., supra note 127 at 1040–41.  Victor Narro, formerly the Workers’ Rights Project 
Director at CHIRLA, helped found NDLON and joined the staff of the UCLA Labor Center.  
Victor H. Narro, UCLA SCH.  L., https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/victor-h-narro 
[https://perma.cc/S7DY-VDU6]. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079764
Movement Lawyers 1499 
 
understood why it was important to stand with immigrants who were most vul-
nerable to criminal and immigration enforcement. 
As S-Comm spread in jurisdictions across the country, activists began to call 
out the Obama Administration, while established advocacy organizations 
remained focused on collaborations with the White House to move CIR in 
Congress.203  Movement lawyers sought to originate legal and political tactics 
against the use of local law enforcement agencies to enforce immigration law, 
informed and animated by the day laborer battles of the preceding decades, as 
well as the twin threat posed to immigrants in Arizona by SB 1070 and Sheriff 
Joe Arpaio.204  Movement actors with roots in local communities understood that 
they could not hold in abeyance opposition to Obama-era immigration enforce-
ment on the frayed thread of a hope that CIR would be revived and passed.205  
Building on the solidaristic narrative described above, activists and lawyers chose 
not to run away from immigrants in the gun sights of ICE and instead found 
ways to criticize and slow the implementation of S-Comm.206  This was a con-
sequence both of critical ideation and common organizational relationships being 
built between activists and lawyers in Arizona and elsewhere. 
Finally, when the stand-alone DREAM Act failed in Congress in late 
2010, activists like Neidi Dominguez began to focus on the possibility of an exec-
utive exercise of categorical discretion.207  Some were opposed because of the 
effect on any remaining chance of moving CIR, while others thought that 
the idea was legally deficient or insufficiently protective.208  Lawyers provided 
support for movement leaders to make the case for categorical executive discretion 
in negotiations with the White House.  Once again, movement actors participated 
in a mutually reinforcing process of critical ideation.  Together, they “ultimately 
restructured the politics of the possible” and worked to persuade policymakers 
outside of the movement.209  Lawyers provided sources of authority, such as prec-
edents from immigration legal history, for the critical ideas being advanced by 
activists in a context of skepticism, if not outright hostility. 
Movement actors in each of these instances collaborated to advance initia-
tives that were outside of the ideational repertoire in the issue area generally in 
society, but perhaps more importantly, outside of the ideational repertoire of 
established advocacy organizations and allied policymakers in the field.  For 
  
203. See supra Sections I.B.–I.D. 
204. See supra Sections I.B.–I.D. 
205. See supra Section I.B. 
206. See supra Section I.C. 
207. See supra Section I.D. 
208. See supra Section I.D. 
209. Guinier & Torres, supra note 182, at 2797, 2798–99. 
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dissenters to move ideas from the margins to the center, they needed to access 
sources of authority found in law, as well as material organizational resources to 
which lawyers have more direct access.  Further, in each of the instances noted 
above, movement actors advanced ideas that they hoped would shift culture and 
not just rules on the books.210  In taking on both policy opponents and putative 
allies, movement actors challenged how advocacy incumbents constrained the 
bounds of political possibility and suppressed the power of new entrants.211  In 
the course of this wave of challenges to advocacy incumbents, they were nour-
ished by and helped build community institutions.212 
B. Resource Generation 
Lawyers in social justice struggles are expected to bring litigation to the table 
as a key resource.213  The 2009–2012 mobilization is especially interesting for two 
reasons.  First, there were already leading legal organizations—ACLU-IRP and 
NILC—litigating in Arizona against Arpaio and SB 1070 with a long track record 
of effective advocacy and deeper pockets than the more movement-centered legal 
and organizing groups on the ground.214  Second, immigration law was and is not 
especially conducive to litigation campaigns due to the plenary power doctrine215 
and the provisions of the 1996 Immigration & Nationality Act amendments that 
strip judges of discretion, move cases from the agency directly to federal appellate 
  
210. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 978 (1997) (“‘Culture-shifting’ laws, by contrast, alter basic principles, and 
alter them in ways that are inescapable—indeed, transformational.  They remake culture.”). 
211. Building on Thomas Stoddard’s observation: “How a new rule comes about [and the standpoint of 
those who advance that rule] may be as important as what it says.”  Id. at 991. 
212. Francesca Polletta, “Free Spaces” in Collective Action, THEORY & SOC’Y, Feb. 1999, at 1, 4 
(“Counterhegemonic frames come not from a disembodied oppositional consciousness or pipeline 
to an extra-systemic emancipatory truth, but from longstanding community institutions.”). 
213. Brisbin noted: “The incentive to engage in collective litigation as an act of resistance lies in its 
relatively low cost and its ability to provide judgments that change the law or convey a message 
about the legal identity and rights of disadvantaged groups.”  Brisbin, supra note 156, at 33; see also 
E. Tammy Kim, Lawyers as Resource Allies in Workers’ Struggles for Social Change, 13 N.Y. CITY L. 
REV. 213, 215–17 (2009) (discussing how lawyers develop litigation that can be nested in multi-
pronged campaigns for social change). 
214. See supra Section I.B. 
215. See Adam Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 378–81 
(2004) (describing the plenary power doctrine’s limits on constitutional challenges to wide-ranging 
immigration policy); see also LEILA KAWAR, CONTESTING IMMIGRATION POLICY IN COURT: 
LEGAL ACTIVISM AND ITS RADIATING EFFECTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 164 
(2015) (arguing that “there is no red herring of assertive constitutional review in immigration 
matters,” and that lawyers and activists have to “look[] beyond compliance with official case 
dispositions”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079764
Movement Lawyers 1501 
 
courts, and prohibit class actions.216  It is possible to raise constitutional concerns 
in affirmative class action cases, but the space for institutional reform litigation is 
narrow relative to other areas of the law. 
Even if one could effectively litigate systemic immigration legal issues, public 
interest lawyers would still face longstanding critiques of the use of litigation as a 
core social change tactic.217  The critiques are variations on the argument that liti-
gation demobilizes otherwise activated constituents: 
[L]itigators too often use state power in service of a principle rather 
than using principle in service of resistance to state power or other 
concentrations of power that undermine democracy.  Causes are 
adjudicated into grievances; constituencies of accountability are 
demobilized.218 
Nevertheless, when the Obama Administration continued the roll-out of S-
Comm, immigrant rights activists and lawyers felt thwarted.  There was no obvious 
legal theory with which to mount a frontal attack due to the interstitial nature of 
the program.  S-Comm was not a legislative enactment requiring hearings and 
votes or even an agency regulation necessitating a rulemaking process.  Instead, it 
consisted of incremental adjustments to the ways in which frontline immigration 
bureaucrats and professionals worked with other actors in law enforcement.219 
Because a direct attack on S-Comm was difficult, alternative strategies 
were necessary.  Working with CCR and the Cardozo clinic, NDLON hit on a 
creative litigation strategy that generated a rich trove of organizing resources: the 
  
216. Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration 
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1443–65 (1997) (setting out jurisdictional limits). 
217. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. 
HIST. 81, 82–83 (1994) (arguing that backlash to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), set back the civil rights movement); see also, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 338–39 (1991) (contending 
that courts do not effect social change); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: 
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 91, 214 (2d ed. Univ. of Mich. Press 
2004) (1974) (positing that the pursuit of rights-based remedies individualizes social problems and 
legitimates the political system). 
218. Guinier & Torres, supra note 182, at 2756 n.49. 
219. Inés Valdez et al., Missing in Action: Practice, Paralegality, and the Nature of Immigration 
Enforcement, 21 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 547, 560 (2017).  As Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman, and Amna 
Akbar note: 
The way that § 287(g) and Secure Communities emerged as constitutive elements 
of the contemporary U.S. immigration enforcement regime has very little to do with 
formal lawmaking and court decision-making, and a lot to do with incremental 
adjustments and re-framing on the terrain of frontline immigration bureaucrats and 
professionals, which result from contentious encounters between differently located 
actors including the courts, DHS leadership, ICE rank-and-file, and civil society actors. 
Id. 
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National Day Laborers Organizing Network v. United States Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcment Agency220 FOIA case.  The litigation provided potent resources 
to advance local organizing—data about arrest and deportations stemming from 
the program, information about the implementation of S-Comm, and state and 
local responses—tied together by a strong national critique of immigration 
enforcement as practiced on the ground.221  These resources strengthened organ-
izing at the grassroots level and aimed local interventions “directly at the level of 
enforcement.” N. ^# 
222  The litigation also exposed the diffuseness of the interior immigration 
enforcement strategy and its inaccurate targeting of community members, refut-
ing the central premise of the program that it made communities safer.  
NDLON served as lead plaintiff in the FOIA litigation.  The CCR and Cardozo 
clinic lawyers were not interacting with community leaders and youth activists as 
they achieved a succession of victories in federal court.223  NDLON was the con-
duit by which critical understanding came to shape a legal case that ultimately 
was handled by what one participant on the team called “mercenary lawyers.”224  
Movement lawyering in this case drew opportunistically on available legal re-
sources.  In addition, the relative instability of the field of immigration advocacy 
in this period and the legislative paralysis in Washington, D.C. opened space for 
movement-centered organizations to focus on ground-level enforcement in pub-
lic advocacy.225 
While the campaign against S-Comm came to be relatively decentralized, 
with opt-out campaigns occurring in sub-federal jurisdictions in which there was 
immigrant political power that could be developed and harnessed by organizers, 
NDLON remained an organizational center of opposition to the program.  It 
brought inconsistencies between administration rhetoric and the operations and 
effects of the program to the attention of elected officials in Congress, who could 
demand internal audits and a degree of accountability to the public.  NDLON’s 
work against the deputation of local law enforcement also led it to become a leading 
force with youth activist groups for the passage of the TRUST Act in the 
  
220. 811 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
221. See Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights 
Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 367, 402 (2000) (“In this movement [referring to 
SNCC], as in others, it was the syncretism of local protest traditions and such ‘master frames’ as 
rights that proved so potent.” (citations omitted)). 
222. Valdez et al., supra note 219, at 562. 
223. Telephone Interview with Peter Markowitz, supra note 82. 
224. Id. 
225. See Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 672 (“When field rules are uncertain, actors tend to be more 
receptive to new perspectives and to engage in search processes to identify alternatives.  Proximate 
fields are a readily available and a trusted source for new ideas and practices.”). 
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California state legislature in 2012 (when it was vetoed by Governor Jerry 
Brown) and 2013 (when it was successfully enacted).  The TRUST Act and AB 
60, which provided driver’s licenses to undocumented residents,226 were legisla-
tive campaigns around which movement groups could organize, particularly in 
light of legislative paralysis at the federal level.227  Groups participated in media 
campaigns, visited legislative offices, and assisted with implementation and 
community education after both measures were signed by the governor in 2013. 
Lawyers made significant contributions in this period and co-generated 
organizing resources with movement leaders and activists.  These resources were 
on a register between the realm of critical ideation and that of material organiza-
tional assets that could be used to strengthen fledgling activist formations.  The 
resources were legal-conceptual and translated into a federal court complaint and 
bill drafts for legislative allies.  The lawyers at NDLON, MALDEF, and the 
UCLA Labor Center were engaged in ongoing discussions with immigrant 
organizers and activists.  They understood the enforcement challenges facing 
immigrant communities and were looking for opportunities to turn state power 
against federal immigration enforcement.228  They found a few such opportuni-
ties in these years and shared what they uncovered with their movement partners. 
C. Accompaniment and Transformation 
During a period of escalating immigration enforcement and of strategic and 
organizational instability in the immigrant rights advocacy sector, movement 
lawyers accompanied leaders, activists, and constituents, as they “came out” into 
the public sphere and asserted their agency.229  At their best, movement lawyers 
  
226. Assemb. B. 60, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (codified at CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1653.5, 
12800, 12801–12801.11 (West 2015 & Supp. 2017)). 
227. Sameer M. Ashar et al., Navigating Liminal Legalities Along Pathways to Citizenship: Immigrant 
Vulnerability and the Role of Mediating Institutions 25–27 (Criminal Justice, Borders and 
Citizenship, Research Paper No. 2733860), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2733860. 
228. See PENDA D. HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS, COMMUNITIES AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 144 (2001).  As Penda Hair explained: 
[L]awyers were most effective when they functioned as part of a broader problem-
solving process, working to mediate between the role of the law and the goals 
of organized and cohesive community members.  This is particularly important 
when community aspirations are not easily translated with the existing paradigms of 
justice.  In this role, lawyers continuously ask how the law can be interpreted and 
applied to advance community goals. 
 Id. 
229. Cf. Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49–66 (2013) (arguing that 
public exposure of undocumented status constitutes an act of resistance). 
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“held space” for activists.230  Lawyers make choices about which individuals and 
groups to represent or accompany.  In a roiling advocacy sector, the lawyers in 
this mobilization narrative chose to ally with youth activists, as they asserted 
agency and rejected the benevolent direction of incumbent policy advocates in the 
immigrant rights field.  When the situation in Arizona came to a head with the 
passage of SB 1070 and the continuing terror spread by Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 
movement lawyers recommitted to supporting new immigrant community 
formations such as Puente.  When RIFA began to break apart in the middle 
Obama years, movement lawyers built common cause with movement activists 
around anti-enforcement messaging, local opt-outs from S-Comm, and categor-
ical discretion proposals.  And when activists met with White House staffers in 
2012 before the announcement of DACA, they were accompanied by their 
movement lawyers.  Lawyers chose activists and activists chose lawyers in these 
instances, under difficult circumstances when former allies were pitted against 
one another.231  This accompaniment in the midst of conflict laid the foundation 
for a series of successful collaborations between lawyers and movement actors. 
As demonstrated in NDLON v. ICE, accountability to relatively powerless 
clients does not necessitate a particular kind of thick lawyer-client relationship; 
rather, it requires an internalized commitment on the part of lawyers to accept 
clients’ methods and goals and a corresponding trust and openness on the part of 
activists toward their lawyer-collaborators.  NDLON had established a com-
mitment to youth activists through its narrative and material support of their work, 
as well as the physical presence of staff lawyers and organizers on the ground in 
Arizona.  In the open records case, as both plaintiff and, informally, co-counsel, it 
was a critical conduit ensuring accountability of the legal team to movement actors. 
Lawyers were present as conditions changed rapidly and were close observers 
of the fast-developing agency of undocumented youth.  Everyday resisters, in the 
  
230. As Chaumtoli Huq explains: 
I come back to the idea of being present for each other, holding space for individuals 
and communities that need that at this moment in my own effort to make sense of 
the present socio-political realities.  For me, this practice of listening, and holding 
space, allows for compassion and empathy that will be essential for any social justice 
path. 
 Chaumtoli Huq, Calling All Movement Lawyers: We Need to Organize Our Legal Support, L. 
MARGINS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://lawatthemargins.com/calling-movement-lawyers-need-
organize-legal-support [https://perma.cc/8MAA-L4M5]; see also Bernard Loomer, Two 
Conceptions of Power, 6 PROCESS STUD. 5, 24 (1976) (“Presence means that both knowing and 
being known are functions of the creativity of both the speaking and the listening.”). 
231. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 11, at 175–87 (describing the eventual SNCC-NLG alliance in 
spite of a long campaign of red-baiting against the Guild). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079764
Movement Lawyers 1505 
 
narratives of Ewick and Sibley232 and Lucie White233 challenge legal forms and 
legal scripts and are themselves changed in some way; in this period, lawyers were 
moved by their work with resisters.234  The foundational commitment of youth 
activists to a critique of criminalization and mass incarceration—across categories 
of immigration status and race—shaped strategy decisions with regard to CIR 
and S-Comm and broadened the focus of movement organizations.235  Lawyers 
help diffuse dissenting ideas and strategies through networks to multiple organi-
zations, including incumbent policy advocates.236  The commitment of activists 
to intersectional identities, as demonstrated by the vibrant presence of LGBT 
immigrants in movement leadership, bound constituencies and taught lawyers to 
refrain from submerging or obscuring issues and experiences that departed from a 
singular narrative manufactured for the consumption of conservative Americans. 
Finally, to the extent that lawyers facilitated activists’ resistance and recon-
struction of law, they also participated in a consolidation of identity.  Ian Haney-
López writes about the development of Chicano identity in Los Angeles following 
the prosecution of movement activists and Oscar Acosta’s defense of those 
activists.237  Acosta put the white establishment on trial in his defense cases.238  
Lawyers have a role in identity consolidation, in the way that they construct 
harms and causalities in advocacy.  In this narrative, activism fueled the creative 
construction of complex, intersectional identities and the need for a greater degree 
of critical consciousness about identity development and community solidarity in 
legal advocacy.  It is incumbent on lawyers to be aware of that feature of move-
ment work and to assure that legal advocacy leaves space for such creative 
  
232. See, e.g., Ewick & Silbey, Conformity, supra note 5; Ewick & Silbey, Narrating, supra note 5. 
233. See, e.g., White supra note 8. 
234. See Corey S. Shdaimah, Lawyers and the Power of Community: The Story of South Ardmore, 42 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 595, 626 (2009) (“We should not underestimate what community groups can 
do for lawyers.  Lawyers who envision their work as part of some greater good derive sustenance 
and inspiration from their work with community organizations or social movements, even dormant 
or nascent ones.”). 
235. See Edelman et al., supra note 152, at 660 (“[S]ocial movement ideals permeate organizations 
indirectly by altering organizations’ institutional environments.”). 
236. Id. at 673.  As Edelman et al. noted: 
Diffusion occurs largely through the work of field actors, especially those who 
work across the boundaries of fields, such as . . . lawyers who work within or advise 
social movements.  These actors may play central roles in helping shifts in meaning 
within one field seep into other fields.  When consciousness begins to shift, 
professional networks become a primary means by which new ideas spread both 
within and across field boundaries. 
 Id. 
237. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 205–29 
(2003). 
238. Id. at 45–55. 
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construction, rather than squeezing people into the pre-existing categories that 
are intuitive to those in power. 
CONCLUSION 
“At the end of the day we have no choice but to fight.”239 
In this first year of the Trump Administration, anti-immigrant animus 
drives a successful campaign intended to evoke fear in communities.240  Sheriff 
Joe Arpaio has been pardoned after his conviction for noncompliance with federal 
court orders prohibiting racial profiling.241  The Trump Administration has ter-
minated DACA.242  Movement actors understood that white supremacy underlay 
Arpaio’s regime of racial profiling and systematic dehumanization in Arizona.  
White supremacy now drives federal immigration enforcement, without shame 
or constraint.243  The trajectory of the immigrant rights movement after 2012 will 
  
239. Jennifer Medina, A Defender of the Constitution, With No Legal Right to Live Here, N.Y. TIMES (July 
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/undocumented-immigrants-illegal-citizen 
ship.html (quoting immigration lawyer Lizbeth Mateo). 
240. Adam Goodman, The Core of Donald Trump’s Immigration Policy?  Fear., WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/08/24/the-core-of-don 
ald-trumps-immigration-policy-fear/?utm_term=.ca4713063287 [https://perma.cc/3DNY-XGAS]. 
241. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who Became Face of 
Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump-pardon-sheriff-arizona.html. 
242. Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on Congress to 
Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-
dreamers-immigration.html. 
243. See Cristina Jiménez, Fighting for Our Lives: Immigrants Rising Up Against White Supremacy, 
MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2017), https://medium.com/@UNITEDWEDREAM/fighting-for-our-
lives-immigrants-rising-up-against-white-supremacy-820f8887e5d7 [https://perma.cc/8G4D-
JLK2].  Jiménez notes: 
The push to enact the Muslim ban, the effort to win Congressional 
funding for the border wall, the building of more detention camps, the 
laughing about police brutality, the hiring of more ICE agents to go to schools, 
churches, and homes to round up immigrant youth and families for detention 
and deportation: all of this is white supremacy in action. 
 Id.; see also Who’s Behind the Plot Against DACA, CTR. NEW COMMUNITY, https:// 
www.plotagainstdaca.com/ [https://perma.cc/QD8L-DFVA].  The Center for New Community 
stated: 
Anti-immigrant organizations like FAIR, CIS, NumbersUSA, and IRLI, 
all of which have ties to white nationalists, have long taken a hardline stance that 
the federal government should dramatically restrict immigration and make life 
as difficult as possible for undocumented immigrants already living 
here. . . .  They are also at the center of the latest assaults on young immigrants. 
 Id.; cf. SASHA POLAKOW-SURANSKY, GO BACK TO WHERE YOU CAME FROM: THE 
BACKLASH AGAINST IMMIGRATION AND THE FATE OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY 280–83 
(2017).  Sasha Polakow-Suransky explains: 
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be the subject of future scholarship.  However, the positive portrayal of movement 
actors and allied lawyers in this Article raises the question of how their assertion 
of agency and development of critical infrastructure gave way to an ascendant 
white supremacist immigration restrictionism. 
It would be a mistake to truncate immigration legal history into a four- or 
six-year period, when we know that cycles of nativism and the resort to forms of 
white supremacy in immigration policy have been with us from the time that the 
first settler-colonialists took the land from Indigenous Peoples and forced Africans 
into slavery to work that land.  In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the 
immigration legal system was in a state of paralysis with a large population of 
undocumented people vulnerable to state violence, intensified after 9/11.  The 
legislative strategy pursued by liberal and moderate politicians for a decade had 
not worked.  Instead, youth activists pushed for more contingent but also more 
immediate remedies as they rose in the immigrant rights advocacy field.  They 
did so with the essential assistance of movement lawyers. 
As we confront the dire need for resistance and reconstruction, this Article 
is an offering: an examination of how the collaborations between movement actors 
and lawyers worked in a brief period of ascension.  This Article describes the role 
of lawyers in a process of resistance to legality and the collaborative reconstruction 
of law and social discourse and it aims to inform and enrich movement lawyering 














The mainstreaming of xenophobic views and policies could eventually undermine the liberal 
democratic model of government in countries that we today regard as progressive and tolerant.  
The result would be a watered-down form of democracy that deprives immigrants and ethnic 
and religious minorities of basic rights.  And, at worst, it would mean a resurgence of the ugliest 
national ideologies that marred the history of the twentieth century. 
 Id. at 292. 
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